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SALES ASPECTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in forty-nine states
has engendered an outpouring of articles whose number far exceeds that
of the reported cases. With a few exceptions,' the majority of these articles
have approached the Code from the view of the merchant and the lender
with virtually no concern for the view of the consumer. This is somewhat
surprising because, although few of us are merchants or lenders, all of us
are consumers. And after all, without consumers there would be no need
for merchants and lenders.
The Code does not define the word "consumer," but it does succinctly
define the phrase "consumer goods" as meaning goods which are "used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."2
Under this definition, the consumer is defined by the purpose of his pur-
chase. On the other hand, the merchant is defined by what he sells or buys
or by his skill;
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill pe-
culiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ-
ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.'
This general definition of merchant includes two classes, (a) the person
who deals in goods of the kind, and (b) those who hold themselves out as
having knowledge or skills peculiar to the goods involved. A retail dealer
who sold household appliances would meet both definitions; a purchasing
agent for a university which is purchasing appliances for its dormitories
would meet only the latter. In addition to the general definition, the Code
defines a particular species of merchant as one "who deals in goods of
that kind"5 or as a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind."' These
1. E.g., Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 1465 (1967); Hollander, Consumer Perspective
and Consumer Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 241
(1965-1966). For a collection of consumer-oriented writings, see THE LAW AND THE Low IN-
COME CONSUMER (C. H. Katz, ed. 1968). See Consumer Protection Symposium, 29 OHIo
ST. L. J. 593 (1968).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(1) [hereinafter cited U.C.C.].
3. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
4. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2.
5. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (emphasis added).
6. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (emphasis added).
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definitional guidelines as to what is a merchant are designed to classify
him as a "professional in business."'
It is submitted that this "professionalization" of the merchant class
is of overriding importance in understanding the intent of the Code when
it speaks of good faith of a merchant as consisting of "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards," of "good faith,"
of "unconscionability," of "implied warranties in sales by merchants in
goods of that kind," etc. As a professional, the merchant who knows his
wares must be held to a higher degree of legal responsibility for his actions
than the unsophisticated consumer with whom he is dealing.
In addition to the above notion of a dichotomy between the merchant
and the consumer, it is important to consider the Code as a thoroughly in-
tegrated articulation wherein one section will relate to a following or pre-
ceding section in the same article or even in different articles. If the lawyer
or court uses tunnel vision in looking solely at one section, the purpose of
the Code will be perverted. For example, when one begins to consider the
warranty sections of the Code he must also consider the rules governing
"cure," "insecurity and adequate assurance," "rejection," "acceptance,"
"revocation of acceptance," etc.
The remainder of this article will deal with the multitude of problems
presented by John Consumer's purchase of a refrigerator and a wall-
installed air-conditioning unit for his home from the Merchants Appliance
Company, and his subsequent credit purchase of a home freezer and
"family food plan" from the Hipressure Food Company in accordance
with the above transactional outline.
II. FORMATION OF THE SALES CONTRACT
A. Good Faith and Unconscionability
The Code imposes upon both the merchant and the consumer the
obligation of good faith in every contract or duty in its performance or
enforcement.8 In addition, the concept of good faith for a merchant
"means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."9 Neither the merchant nor the
consumer may disclaim this good faith obligation by contract; however,
they may provide in their contract certain criteria to measure good faith
performance if the criteria "are not manifestly unreasonable."' 0
Professor Britton has suggested (in regard to a prior version of
Article 3) that the Code, in providing that the merchant must observe
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade, has invited
the courts to make invidious distinctions between various trades." For
7. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2.
8. U.C.C. § 1-203.
9. U.C.C.§ 2-103(1) (b).
10. U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
11. Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
example, a court might suggest that there is a lower standard of fair deal-
ing in the used car trade than in the furniture trade and that the honesty
of the merchant is to be measured by a higher or lower standard depend-
ent upon his trade. On the other hand, it is submitted that in construing
the phrase "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards" the courts should note that the use of the conjunction "and"
requires the merchant to be both honest in fact and to observe the stan-
dards of fair dealing in his trade. The real purpose of this rule would seem
to be to give the courts some kind of objective standard in order to test
the merchant's subjective assertion that he was in good faith and was
honest in the particular transaction. Professor Mentschikoff has demon-
strated that the New York courts have in fact been using this reasonable
commercial standard even though the judicial language has been couched
in the terms of good faith from a subjective viewpoint. 2 The Code by
commingling subjective good faith and an objective standard has given the
courts a workable tool to evaluate the ephemeral concept of good faith
with which the courts have been wrestling for many years.
One acute observer has opined that good faith is an "excluder" phrase
in the sense that a court will label certain conduct as bad faith, rather
than attempt to define what is good faith.'3 It is often easier to define and
apply a negative than a positive. However, the Code takes a more positive
approach in stating that a merchant must observe "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." 4 Involved in this "fair dealing"
notion is the level of sophistication of the seller and buyer. Let us assume
that John Consumer is illiterate (or literate only in a foreign language)
and signs a purchase contract and a security agreement furnished by
Merchants Appliance Company for the credit purchase of an air-condi-
tioner and refrigerator. John does not have the two agreements read to
him by a relative or friend, and later discovers that the written agree-
ment does not contain the terms orally agreed upon. The traditional view
has been the courts will not protect John when he asserts that the agree-
ments were obtained by fraud because he could have had the agreements
read to him and was not free from negligence in protecting himself. 5 The
author suggests a different approach, as follows: Is it good faith-is it
"fair dealing in the trade"-for the merchant to have an illiterate sign a
contract which does not incorporate the oral agreement of the parties
regardless of the fact that the illiterate could have had the agreement
read to him? In sum, the focus of the test should be on the actions of the
Instruments Law with those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L.
REV. 417, 431-432 (1954).
12. 1 N.Y. LAW REVISION CoM'N REP. 213-240 (1954).
13. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
14. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b) (emphasis added).
15. The facts outlined would give rise to a "personal" defense which would not be valid
against a holder in due course of any negotiable instrument signed by John Consumer. See
U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (c) and Comment 7.
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merchant seller rather than on the failure to act of the consumer buyer. If
this test were used, it would not impose any hardship upon the majority of
honest merchants. The dishonest merchant, of course, would be adversely
affected, and he ought to be.
Closely related to the good faith notion is the reverse concept that if
a court finds as a matter of law that the contract or part of a contract was
unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce
the contract or may invalidate an unconscionable clause and enforce the
remainder. The court may also limit the application of an "unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."' 6 The Comments note that:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscion-
able under the circumstances existing at the time of the making
of the contract....
Applying the unconscionability rule to the facts of our hypothetical
problem, if Merchants Appliance Company should orally represent to
John Consumer that the refrigerator is new, but nothing was stated in the
written contract as to its being new and the refrigerator is in fact a used
one, a disclaimer of all warranties asserted by Credit Appliance Company
as a defense could be invalidated as being unconscionable and in bad faith
or could be limited in application by a holding that it does not apply to
the oral representations of newness. Under either approach, a court could
avoid overreaching by the dealer.
Whatever may be said as to the vagueness of the concept of "uncon-
scionability" (and much has been said)8,' it must be noted that whenever
the question is raised "the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination."' The commercial evidence
is to be heard by the trial judge without a jury, and he must make the
ultimate determination as to the question of unconscionability. Hence,
even though the standard may be vague, Merchants (in our hypothetical
problem) would be protected from whims of a consumer-oriented jury.20
If trial court judges have been able to apply vague "due process" concepts
in criminal matters and "unconscionable conduct" in equity matters for
many years, they should not have any great problems under the Code.2'
16. U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
17. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
18. The unconscionability rule of the Code has been severely criticized because it fails to
define the concept and the Comments to section 2-302 are mere circumlocutions. Left, Uncon-
scionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). For
a more temperate view see Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1465, 1473 (1967). See also Com-
ment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 998 (1966) and Comment, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 401 (1961).
19. U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
20. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 3.
21. Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 121 (1967).
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As might be surmised, almost all of the reported consumer cases
which have arisen under the unconscionability defense have primarily in-
volved the unconscionable behavior of a vendor of consumer goods in
obtaining one-sided credit advantages in installment payment contracts
rather than the quality of the consumer goods. These cases are discussed
in a subsequent section. 22
B. Written Formalities-Statute of Frauds
The Code provides that a contract for the sale of goods for a price
of five hundred dollars or more is not enforceable unless it is written and
signed by the person against whom the contract is asserted. The written
contract is valid even though terms are left out or are incorrectly stated;
however, the written contract cannot be enforced "beyond the quantity of
goods shown in such writing."2 As a result, John Consumer could be held
liable on an oral contract to purchase the refrigerator and air-conditioner
from Merchants Appliance Company if the total sales price did not equal
five hundred dollars. Conversely, if the total sales price were in excess of
this amount, the contract would have to be in writing and signed by John
Consumer to bind him. If the written contract listed the refrigerator and
air-conditioner, Merchants Appliance Company would be prevented from
asserting that John Consumer had contracted to purchase additional appli-
ances whose listing was inadvertently omitted.
If we assume that John Consumer orally agreed to purchase, for a
total price exceeding five hundred dollars, the above appliances together
with other appliances and that the Credit Appliance Company actually
delivered the refrigerator and air-conditioner, John Consumer would be
liable only for the purchase price of those goods "which [had] been re-
ceived and accepted." '24 It should be noted that if, after a reasonable op-
portunity to inspect the goods, John Consumer should reject the refriger-
ator and the air-conditioner on the grounds that they did not conform to
the contract of sale, he would not be deemed to have accepted them under
the statute of frauds exception and would not be liable for their purchase
price.25 It may be asked whether John Consumer's right to reject requires
a bona fide belief that the goods do not conform to the contract or whether
he may refuse to accept them in the first instance if he has changed his
mind between the time that he ordered the goods and the actual delivery.
The answer under the Code is not entirely clear. The statute of frauds
rule26 makes a cross-reference to section 2-606, which defines the concept
of acceptance. Under this latter section in conjunction with section 2-602,
it would appear that any revocation of acceptance would have to be based
22. See page 56 infra.
23. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
24. U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c).
25. U.C.C. § 2-606.
26. U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c).
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upon the fact that the goods did not conform to the contract. However, if
for any reason John Consumer should reject the tender upon delivery un-
der section 2-602 this would negate any idea of "acceptance," and he
would not be liable under the oral contract. It may be argued that a "re-
fusal of tender" is just another way of expressing a "rejection" of a tender,
and that under section 2-602 the rejection must be rightful or the buyer
may be held liable for breach of contract. It is suggested that the con-
cept of rejection in section 2-602 presupposes the existence of a valid con-
tract of sale, not a case involving an oral contract wherein the statute of
frauds may be a defense. If the rule is otherwise, it deprives the word
"accepted" of any meaning.
Defaulting consumers are also concerned with a new principle
adopted by the Code, namely that if the consumer is sued by the mer-
chant and the defendant-consumer "admits in his pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, 27 the contract may
be enforced. However, the contract may not be enforced "beyond the
quantity of goods admitted. 2 8 No one would quarrel with this rule, but
how practical is it? If the local rules of procedure permit a motion to
dismiss for affirmative defenses appearing on the face of the plaintiff's
complaint, one may never get into court. Would pre-trial discovery or
discovery procedure before suit is filed which resulted in a deposition
satisfy this test? The Comments make no mention of depositions or in-
terrogatories, and courts may give this rule a narrow construction. 9
The statute of frauds section of the Code has also made a modifica-
tion of the part performance rule regarding the payment of part of the
purchase price. Let us assume that John Consumer orally purchased a
refrigerator, a stove and an air-conditioner, each appliance having a pur-
chase price of $250. John paid $250 of the total purchase price of $750,
but Merchants Appliance Company refuses to deliver the three appli-
ances. Under pre-Code law John would be able to enforce the contract for
all three appliances on the grounds of part performance. Now, if the court
can make a just apportionment of the agreed purchase price, John can
only recover one of the appliances. ° If John had paid only $125 it would
be impossible to make a "just apportionment" of the money paid toward
any of the appliances, and John could not enforce the contract. This view
has been followed by a lower Pennsylvania court, but rejected by a lower
New York court. In the Pennsylvania case"1 the buyer paid $100 down on
two vats selling for a total of $1,600 and the court said there could not be
any apportionment. In the New York case32 the buyer paid $25 down
27. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
28. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
29. E.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). See W. HAwxLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 31-32 (2d
ed. 1958).
30. U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 2.
31. Williamson v. Matz, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33 (1956).
32. Star v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 271, 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (N.Y. 1st Dist. Ct.
1967).
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toward the purchase of a car and the court held in favor of the buyer. It
is submitted that the New York court is clearly wrong; it is looking at
the U.C.C. with Uniform Sales Act spectacles.3
C. Modification, Rescission and Waiver
In a consumer sales contract, it is commonplace for the merchant to
make additional promises to the consumer after the delivery of the goods.
In the past, the merchant has been able to welch on his promises on the
theory that they were not supported by a present consideration. The Code
has eliminated this defense by providing that an agreement to modify a
sales contract "needs no consideration to be binding." 4 In addition, a
written contract can be modified by a subsequent oral agreement. The
merchant's written form contract may provide that it cannot be orally
modified or rescinded, but this clause is not binding upon the consumer
unless he separately signs it. 5 Signing in this context would at least re-
quire the consumer to initial the clause in the margin of the contract.3 8 It
is hazarded that this separate signing, which will draw the attention of
consumers to the clause (the obvious intention of the requirement), may
result in a consumer's refusal to sign, with the concomitant result that the
merchant will have no legal defense to a consumer's claim of modification.
If consumer resistance to signing these clauses becomes widespread, mer-
chants will probably abandon the use of these clauses in their form
contracts.
One caveat to the foregoing discussion must be noted. If the modified
sales contract provides for a sales price of five hundred dollars or more,
then the modification must also be in writing where the contract is execu-
tory in the sense that neither delivery of goods nor payment of money has
occurred.7
III. SALES ON APPROVAL
Occasionally, merchants will sell consumer goods on a sale on ap-
proval or on a trial or satisfaction basis, and the consumer will be con-
cerned with his rights and duties under such a contract. Prior to the Code
there was a conflict as to whether the buyer's approval had to be based
upon a reasonable buyer's approval or upon the purely subjective approval
of each particular buyer.3 8 The Code does not decide this question, but it
would appear that a buyer's disapproval would have to be in good faith.
This may act as a brake upon the exercise of disapproval by buyers who
"purchase" with no intention of ever consummating the sale.
33. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS § 2.04[5] [b] (1966).
34. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
35. U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
36. U.C.C. § 1-201(39), Comment 39.
37. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
38. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS -§ 265 (1960) and 1 S. WLISTON, SALES 483-488
(1948).
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Any goods which are possessed by a consumer buyer on a sale on
approval are not subject to the consumer's creditors until he has accepted
them. This rule may be of more concern to merchants than to consumers.39
In the absence of any clause to the contrary in the agreement, risk of
loss and title does not pass to John Consumer until he accepts the goods."0
John's use of the goods in a manner consistent with the purpose of the
trial will not constitute an acceptance. However, John's failure to "season-
ably" (within a time specified in the agreement or within a reasonable time
when no time is specified) 4' notify Merchants Appliance Company of his
election to return the goods will constitute an acceptance. 42 As a practical
matter, it is ventured that most merchants will clearly specify a cut-off
date in the agreement.
If the goods consist of more than one unit or item, John Consumer
must reject all of the units or items if any are unsatisfactory, because his
"acceptance of any part is an acceptance of the whole." 43 However, the
sale may be in the form of alternatives. For example, John Consumer
could be given possession of two different makes of electric can openers,
from which he is to make a selection. In this case, the approval of one
would not, of course, constitute an approval of both.44
The Code takes the rather dogmatic approach that "after due noti-
fication of election to return, the return is at the seller's risk and expense
but a merchant buyer must follow any reasonable instructions."45 The Com-
ments stress this view by stating that the notice of election to return by
the buyer in a sale on approval is sufficient to relieve the non-merchant
buyer of "any further liability."46 It is submitted, however, that John
Consumer, in spite of both of these statements, would be liable if he
failed to exert reasonable care for the "disapproved" goods prior to return
or was careless in the actual return. A lack of reasonable care-a "don't
care" attitude-would hardly meet a standard of good faith, and the Com-
ments note that the provisions of both the Code and of the contract on
this point "must be read with commercial reason and with full attention to
good faith.147 This is merely a reiteration of the all-embracing good faith
rule which runs throughout the Code.
IV. BUYER's LIABILITY FOR NON-ACCEPTANCE OR REPUDIATION
John Consumer has signed an agreement with Merchants Appliance
Company to purchase the air-conditioner and refrigerator. The day be-
fore delivery John learns that a competitor of Merchants is selling the
39. U.C.C. § 2-326(2).
40. U.C.C. § 2-327(1) (a).
41. U.C.C. § 1-204(3).
42. U.C.C. § 2-327(1)(b).
43. U.C.C. § 2-327(1)(b).
44. U.C.C. § 2-327, Comment 1.
45. U.C.C. § 2-327(1) (c).
46. U.C.C. § 2-327, Comment 4.
47. Id.
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identical goods for considerably less. John telephones Merchants and tells
it that "the deal is off." Prior to the Code, Merchants could sue, but its
remedy was illusory because the general rule was that Merchants could
only recover as damages the difference between the market price of the
goods and the sales price to John.48 If these two prices were the same,
Merchants could only recover nominal damages; if the contract sales
price was less than market price, again Merchants could recover no real
damages. As a result of this pre-Code rule, purchase contracts in reality
bound only the merchant and not the consumer.
The Code has changed these one-sided-duty contracts. Today, Mer-
chants could still sue John for the difference between the market price at
the time and place of tender and the unpaid contract price.49 In addition,
John would be liable for any incidental damages such as expenses in-
curred in the transportation, care and custody of the goods in connection
with the return or resale of the goods after the buyer's breach.1r However,
if this remedy would not place Merchants in as good a position as per-
formance would have, then Merchants may recover the profit, including
reasonable overhead, which Merchants would have made from the sale
if John had performed, together with the incidental damages noted above
and allowance for costs reasonably incurred, but less expenses saved. 1
Under this rule, Merchants at the very least would be able to recover the
difference between the costs of the goods to it and the contract price to
John-in effect, Merchants is given the benefit of the bargain.
It is doubtful that many retail vendors will take advantage of this
rule because the customer ill-will engendered by numerous suits might
exceed the "profits" which are recovered by suit. However, lawyers con-
cerned with consumer rights must weigh this section when their clients
are faced with contentious retail merchants.
V. RISKS OF Loss PRIOR TO DELIVERY
Occasionally, the consumer will be concerned with risks of loss of the
goods prior to their being delivered to him. For example, John Consumer
may purchase a refrigerator and air-conditioner from Merchants Appli-
ance Company by paying cash or by making a down payment and giving
a purchase money security interest to the vendor. John requests Mer-
chants to retain the goods for a few days until John moves into his new
home. The following things may happen to the goods while they are in
possession of Merchants: (a) the goods purchased by John may be de-
stroyed by fire or windstorm; (b) a judgment lien creditor of Merchants
may levy execution on these goods; and (c) Merchants may go into volun-
48. U.C.C. § 2-708, Comment 2.
49. U.C.C. § 2-708(1).
50. U.C.C. § 2-710.
51. U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
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tary or involuntary bankruptcy, and the trustee in bankruptcy will claim
the goods purchased by John. Each of these problems will be discussed in
order.
The Code provides that John Consumer has an insurable interest in
the refrigerator and air-conditioner at the point that the sale is made of
identified existing goods, e.g., those selected directly from the showroom
floor or taken from stock and designated by the vendor as goods to which
the contract refers. 2 Hence, if John's own insurance policy is broad
enough to cover these undelivered goods (perhaps a rare case) he is pro-
tected from fire and windstorm loss when the goods are destroyed in the
Merchants Company's store. Of more practical importance, the Code pro-
vides that the risk of loss in a sale by a merchant to a buyer does not pass
the risk to the buyer in this fact pattern until delivery is made to the
buyer.53 The rationale is that the merchant vendor will probably carry
insurance to cover goods in his possession, while the consumer buyer
would not usually have this coverage. 54 Of course, if the merchant is not
insured (or underinsured) and is rendered insolvent as a result of the fire
or windstorm, the ultimate loss will fall on John Consumer.
Under the pre-Code fraudulent conveyance statutes found in most
states, a creditor of Merchants could claim that the retention of possession
of the goods by Merchants after the sale to John Consumer was fraudu-
lent, and that he could levy on the goods. The Code incorporates this
pre-Code law, but it provides that "retention of possession in good faith
and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially rea-
sonable time after a sale ... is not fraudulent."55 It would seem that Mer-
chants' agreement to retain possession for a few days until John Consumer
moved into his new home would satisfy the "good faith and current
course of trade" criteria of this section, and John should be able to re-
cover the goods from the attaching lien creditor.
If we assume that the refrigerator and air-conditioner were taken
from Merchants' showroom floor or were designated as the goods sold to
John when taken from Merchants' stock, John Consumer, having paid all
or a portion of the price, could recover the goods from the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, provided that Merchants became insolvent within ten days after
receipt of the first installment on their price and provided that John makes
a continuing tender of any unpaid portion of the purchase price.5" In the
event that the insolvency did not occur within this limited ten-day period,
he will be relegated to the position of a creditor under the provisions of
article nine.57
52. U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (a) and (b).
53. U.C.C. § 2-509(3).
54. U.C.C. § 2-509, Comment 3.
55. U.C.C. § 2-402(2).
56. U.C.C. § 2-502(1).
57. U.C.C. § 2-502, Comment 2.
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VI. ExPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF TITLE AND QUALITY
A. Warranties of Title and Cure
John Consumer need have little concern for the possibility that Mer-
chants Appliance Company did not have good title to the new air-
conditioner and new refrigerator which it has sold to him because Mer-
chants likely acquired these goods from a wholesaler or jobber who in
turn acquired them from a manufacturer. Any security interest created by
Merchants in its purchase of these goods from its supplier would be cut
off by the sale to John as a buyer in ordinary course of business.58 How-
ever, if John purchased a used, trade-in air-conditioner and refrigerator
from Merchants, Merchants might not have good title if it received these
units from a consumer who had purchased them on a purchase money
security interest from another retail merchant. An unsatisfied purchase
money security interest on consumer goods will not be cut off, even though
a financing statement has not been filed, upon a trade-in of the unit to
Merchants for purposes of re-sale, 9 and courts might hold that John's
purchase does not fit within the scope of section 9-307 (2) and therefore
is subject to the unfiled security interest. If the first retail vendor filed
his security interest, there would be little doubt that John takes subject to
it.60 In this latter case, a breach of warranty of title question would arise.
To take a more commonplace example, assume John Consumer pur-
chases a used car from a new or used automobile dealer. The dealer
applies for a new car title in the name of John Consumer, and then it is dis-
covered that a third person has title to or a security interest in the auto-
mobile. Under the Code, the automobile dealer warrants that the title
which he conveyed was good and its transfer rightful and that the title is
free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which John
Consumer had no actual knowledge at the time of sale."' This warranty is
not labeled as an implied warranty; hence a broad disclaimer clause in the
contract of sale disclaiming all expressed and implied warranties will not
be sufficient to disclaim a warranty of title.6 2 The automobile dealer may,
of course, disclaim any warranty of title, but the sales agreement must use
specific language in order to do this. Of course, if John Consumer knows
or has reason to know that the automobile dealer does not claim title in
himself or that he is selling only such right or title that a third person may
have, then there will not be a warranty of title. For example, if the auto-
mobile dealer told John Consumer that he (the dealer) did not own the
58. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See Everett Nat'l Bank v. Albert Deschuiteneer, 37 U.S.L.W. 2076
(Sup. Ct. N.H. July 17, 1968).
59. U.C.C. § 9-307(2). U.G.I. v. McFalls, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 813 (C.P. Lancaster County
1959).
60. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
61. U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (a) and (b). For the consumer's rights against the third party
security interest holder see Comment, Section 9-103 and the Interstate Movement of Goods,
9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 72 (1967).
62. U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 6.
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car but was only selling it for another on a "consignment basis" as his
agent, then a court could hold that there was no warranty by the dealer."
The breach of warranty of title occurs upon tender of delivery of
the automobile to John Consumer regardless of the fact that John may
not be aware of the defective title, and he must commence suit against
the dealer within a four-year period from the date of tender.6 4 However,
the original sales contract may reduce this period of limitation to one year,
and John Consumer's lawyer must examine the sales contract for this
possibility. 5 John Consumer's lawyer must also be concerned with notice
to the dealer of the breach of warranty. If John Consumer becomes aware
of the breach before he accepts the tender of delivery, he may reject the
tender and must notify the vendor of his rejection within a reasonable
time.66 If he discovers the defective title after he has accepted the car,
John may revoke his acceptance, and again he must give the vendor notice
within a reasonable time.6 7 The Comments note that this concept of reason-
able time in giving the notice of breach of warranty is to avoid misleading
or prejudicing an innocent vendor-one who did not know that the
title was defective. This same consideration need not be extended to a
bad faith vendor, and "in such case the 'reasonable time' for notice should
receive a very liberal interpretation."6 8
The good or bad faith of the car dealer may have further significance.
Should the vendor have the right to "cure" the defective title, assuming
that he is able to so do? Section 2-508 of the Code states that when the
buyer rejects any non-conforming tender of delivery and the time for
performance has not expired, the seller may "seasonably" notify the buyer
of his intention to cure and then make a conforming delivery within the
contract time. This sub-section would not seem applicable because the
"time for performance" has expired upon delivery to John Consumer.
Sub-section 2 of 2-508 seems to have some relevancy. It provides that
when a buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had rea-
sonable grounds to believe would be acceptable, the seller may "season-
ably" notify the buyer and have a further reasonable time to substitute
a conforming tender. It is believed that courts should hold that a bad
faith vendor would not have reasonable grounds to believe that his buyer
would knowingly accept a defective title, and the seller should be barred
from asserting a right to cure the title. In this situation, however, courts
should hold that the seller has a duty to cure at the option of the buyer.
The buyer may be happy with the quality of the automobile and might
prefer to keep it upon the seller's cure of the defect in title.
The good faith vendor who has breached his warranty presents a
63. U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
64. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) ; and U.C.C. 1 2-312, Comment 2.
6S. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
66. U.C.C. § 2-602, Comment 1.
67. U.C.C. §2-608(1) and (2).
68. U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 2.
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stronger case for the application of section 2-508 as a matter of right.
The good faith vendor who believes that he has title has reasonable
grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable. On the other hand, his
reasonable grounds to believe are based upon an erroneous premise, and
are courts to judge the reasonableness of his grounds upon the true facts
or upon what he believes the facts to be? Cases prior to the Code gave
the vendor a right to cure the defective title when little or no material
delay or damage would occur to the buyer,"9 and this Code section may
be an inartful articulation of the same rule. The Comments state that this
provision is designed to prevent injustice to the seller because of a "sur-
prise rejection" by the buyer seemingly on a question of quality of the
goods;7 0 the Comments do not mention the word "title." The rejection
by the buyer is hardly a matter of surprise. The surprise in the case of
the good faith seller is surprise that the facts are not as he thought
them to be, and this is not the fault of the buyer or any injustice to the
seller when the buyer rejects. There may be the following countervailing
argument: assuming that the vendor has acted in good faith, should not
the buyer be forced to act in good faith7 ' in demanding his "rights?"
Should not a court hold that it is unjust to the seller to take back the
automobile and refund the purchase price when he is willing to cure
the defect and to respond for any "real" damages incurred by the buyer?
The buyer, under this approach, will get exactly what he bargained for.
Lawyers for consumers are cautioned that there have been no cases
interpreting this section. Additionally, the authorities are unsure as to its
application in the title area.72
If we assume that the seller may, under certain circumstances, have
a right to cure the defective title, another section of the Code comes into
play. After the automobile dealer has notified John Consumer of his intent
to cure the defective title, John has the right to demand in writing of the
dealer that it give "adequate assurance of due performance."73 John may
also suspend his own payments on chattel paper which is still held by
the dealer.74 (Whether he is able to suspend payments to a finance company
which has received the paper from the dealer is touched upon in another
part of this article.) 75 If the dealer fails to respond by promising adequate
assurance within thirty days after he receives the demand from John,
this will constitute a repudiation of the contract.
76
If the dealer is a reputable company, adequate assurance may con-
69. Hawkland, Curing on Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Com-
mercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1962).
70. U.C.C. § 2-508, Comment 2.
71. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3) and 1-203.
72. Compare Hawkland, note 69 supra with R. DUESENBERO & L. KING, SALES AND BULK
TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5.05(2) (1966).
73. U.C.C. § 2-609(1).
74. U.C.C. § 2-609(1).
75. See page 64 infra.
76. U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
THE CONSUMER AND THE CODE
sist simply of a written promise to cure the defect. Conversely, if the
dealer is a fly-by-night, adequate assurance may consist of an indemnity
bond posted by an indemnity company and paid for by the dealer.7 7 The
Code does not define the standard for determining what is "adequate
assurance," but simply states that it is "subject to the ... test of factual
conditions" in a commercial setting.78
B. Damages for Breach of Warranty of Title
The Code broadly states that the damages for breach of warranty
are "the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value
of the goods and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted," unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount."17  This subtraction standard is easily applicable in
the case of a breach of warranty of quality, but it becomes difficult to
apply in the case of a breach of warranty of title. If we assume that the
vendor will not be permitted by a court to cure the defective title or is
unable to do so (if permitted), then the buyer should be able to revoke
his acceptance and return the goods to the seller who should then be
liable for the entire purchase price. In the majority of pre-Code cases,
the seller was not permitted to deduct the use value (or depreciation)
from the sales price which he had to return to the buyer.80 On a similar
basis, if the true owner of the chattel removed the chattel from the
possession of the buyer, then the seller was liable for the purchase price
to the buyer. The Code's subtraction formula is applicable to these situa-
tions; the "value" at the time and place of acceptance should ordinarily
be considered as being zero, while the "value" they would have had if
they had been as warranted should be the purchase price. This application
would result in the same damages as were recoverable prior to the Code.
If we say that the value of the goods is to be determined "at the time and
place of acceptance,"'" this language would tend to show that the seller
may not deduct any use or depreciation value for the time that the goods
were in the hands of the buyer; the "time and place of acceptance" would
appear to be a cut-off date in the formula.
In addition to the above standard of damages, the buyer may also
be entitled to recover incidental and consequential damages growing out
of the breach of warranty.8 2 For example, should the buyer expend money
in curing the defect or be deprived of possession for a period of time by
77. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
78. Id.
79. U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
80. Hawkland, note 69 supra.
81. U.C.C. § 2-714(2). If the buyer justifiably revokes his acceptance because of breach
of warranty of title, he may recover the purchase price which he paid, purchase replacement
goods ("cover") and then recover the difference between the cost of cover and the contract
price together with any incidental damages. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711(1), 2-712 and 2-715.
82. U.C.C. §§ 2-714(3) and 2-715.
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a true owner who has replevied the goods, or should he be put to addi-
tional expense in purchasing substitute goods as "cover" 83 for the original
goods, all of these expenses could be recovered from the seller.
In the event that the breach of warranty comes to the attention of
the buyer before he has paid the entire purchase price to the seller, the
buyer may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from the
remaining unpaid purchase price.84 In this factual setting, the buyer
would cease making all payments.
C. Warranties of Quality
1. INTRODUCTION
From a casual reading of the plethora of law review articles, notes
and comments it would appear that almost every retail sale of consumer
goods results in injuries or death to the consumer. This overemphasis on
the unusual has resulted in a slighting of the usual, and little attention
has been paid to the rights of the consumer in getting what he bargained
for-satisfactory goods-which do not, in the vast majority of cases,
cause injury. The remainder of this section will deal exclusively with the
latter aspect of warranties.
In any given sales transaction, the merchant may give express war-
ranties, and the law may also impress implied warranties on the sales
transaction. The two kinds of warranties will often overlap in the trans-
action, and it will be unnecessary in most cases for the courts to draw a
demarcation line between them. However, when the warranties are incon-
sistent or when there is a disclaimer of one kind of warranty or the other,
it becomes important to label them in order to determine which warranty
has survived the inconsistency or the disclaimer. In addition, most courts
and lawyers have been in the habit of dividing warranties into express and
implied, and it is difficult to overcome this propensity.
2. EXPRESS WARRANTIES, DISCLAIMERS AND PAROL EVIDENCE
Let us assume that Merchants Appliance Company's salesman told
John Consumer that a particular air-conditioner on the showroom floor
would cool X number of cubic feet to Y degrees in John's house. John
looked at the machine, and the salesman said that John could have the
exact model number for a certain price. The air-conditioner is then
delivered and installed. John discovers that it will not cool in the manner
represented and that the company has given him a different model. Let
us further assume that the sales invoice contains a statement in small
print at the bottom that "there are no express warranties in the sale of
the goods except as stated on the invoice." John complains to Merchants,
and it relies on the statement on the invoice as a defense. It would appear
83. U.C.C. § 2-712, Comment 4; U.C.C. J§ 2-715(2) (a) and 2-716(3).
84. U.C.C. § 2-717.
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on these assumed facts that Merchants' salesman made an affirmation of
fact or promise as to the cooling properties of this unit which becomes
part of the basis of the bargain, an express warranty. 5 In addition, Mer-
chants, by describing the machine by the model number and by showing
John a "sample" 6 showroom model, also expressly warranted that he
would receive an air-conditioner of that "description 8s7 and that it would
conform to the sample seen by John, assuming that the description and
the sample were part of the basis of the bargain. (The presumption is that
they were part of the basis of the bargain.88 ) The "basis of the bargain"
test is not the equivalent of the pre-Code rule that the buyer had to show
reliance on the statements of the seller in order to establish an express
warranty.' Reliance need not be shown to constitute any particular state-
ment of the vendor as part of the bargain. Of course, these different
tests may have the following same result in any particular case: if the
buyer did not rely it might not be a basis of the bargain. However, this
change in thrust becomes particularly important in the case of modifica-
tion of the contract. For example, assume that John Consumer has paid
cash for the air-conditioner and the salesman has given him a receipt for
the payment. The salesman then makes additional affirmations or state-
ments about the performance of this air-conditioner. These statements
are modifications of the original sales contract and become part of the
basis of the bargain even though, of course, there is no reliance (because
the sale is already consummated) and even though there is no additional
consideration given by John for this affirmation.90
The question remains as to the efficacy of the attempted disclaimer
on the invoice; the Comments note that a disclaimer clause in the form
suggested would not be effective to negative the three warranties given. 91
This theme is further amplified in section 2-316(1) which states that
words or conduct which indicate the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit an express warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, but negation
is inoperative to the extent that this construction is unreasonable.
If John Consumer signs the purchase invoice upon delivery, and the
invoice does not contain any model number, description or any statement
about the cooling qualities of the unit, how can parol evidence be brought
in? The Code has broadened the orthodox parol evidence rule. Any terms
of a written agreement "which are intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement" may not be contradicted by evidence of
a prior or contemporaneous parol agreement.92 However, these agreed-
85. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (a).
86. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (c).
87. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (b).
88. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 6.
89. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
90. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 7 and U.C.C. § 2-209.
91. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comments I and 4.
92. U.C.C. § 2-202.
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upon written terms may be "explained or supplemented""3 by a course of
dealing (prior transactions between these parties)9" or usage of the trade'
or by a course of performance between the parties in carrying out other
parts, if any, of their contract.9" In addition, parol evidence of "consistent
additional terms" can be brought in "unless the court finds the writing
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement." 97 Under the assumed facts, inasmuch as the
invoice did not describe the air-conditioner by model number (as dis-
tinguished from a serial number) or state its cooling properties, parol
evidence of these matters would be termed "consistent" and could be
introduced.
The following limitation on the above must be noted: if the court
finds that the writing was intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement, it may not permit the use of
parol evidence. 98 What should be the result under our assumed transac-
tion if the sales invoice states that "this sales invoice is a complete,
final and exclusive statement of the sale and all prior and contemporaneous
oral agreements are merged herein and this invoice may not be modified,
explained or supplemented except by written agreement?" If courts were
to give effect to the literal meaning of these words, it would behoove
Merchants to describe goods as briefly as possible, e.g., "one X brand
air-conditioner" without any model number, year of manufacture, etc.
This vague description coupled with the integration clause would then
fit within the Comment view that "if the additional terms are such that,
if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document
in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be
kept from the trier of fact." 99 Under this approach, the consumer must
insist that any written evidence of the sales contract clearly spell out
the affirmations regarding the qualities and description of the goods (when
the written agreement has a boiler-plate integration clause), or that the
agreement rest entirely in parol form.
3. EXPRESS WARRANTIES OF PERFORMANCE UNDER A GUARANTY PERIOD
Today, many kinds of consumer hardgoods (e.g., automobiles, tele-
vision sets, air-conditioners, washers and dryers, etc.) are sold under an
agreement whereby the manufacturer (and the dealer) will "guaranty"
the goods by agreeing to repair or replace defective parts within a speci-
fied guaranty period. Neither the express nor the implied warranty sections
of the Code even recognize the existence of this commonplace warranty
93. Id.
94. U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
95. U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
96. U.C.C. § 1-205(3).
97. U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
98. U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
99. U.C.C. § 2-202, Comment 3.
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agreement, and only two sections make passing reference to it. Section
2-725(2) provides that a breach of warranty occurs upon tender of de-
livery in the normal case. However, if the warranty "explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods" and discovery of the breach must
await the time of performance, then the cause of action accrues when the
breach is or should have been discovered. Section 2-719 (1)(a) provides
that the sales agreement may limit or alter the measure of damages by
limiting the buyer to a return of the goods and repayment of the price
by the seller or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
parts. It should be noted that any attempt to limit consequential damages
for injury to the person in the sale of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable, "but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not." 0 Under this latter rule, it would be perfectly permissible for
the form sales contract of an automobile dealer to provide that its war-
ranty to repair and replace defective parts during the warranty period
is in lieu of all other remedies by the consumer buyer for any consequen-
tial damages for loss of use of the automobile while it is being repaired.
These express warranties of performance raise additional problems
dealing with disclaimers. A Virginia court has held that a new car war-
ranty which provided that it "was in lieu of all other warranties" had
the effect of excluding an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. The case was not controlled by the Code, but the court ruled
that the Code had made no change in this rule.' The court expressly
refused to follow the New Jersey case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 2 which held that any disclaimer of liability for personal injury was
contrary to public policy.
These express warranties of performance have also become inter-
woven with the buyer's right to revoke his acceptance during the warranty
period and the dealer's right to "cure" when confronted with this revoca-
tion. In Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury, Co.103 the buyer heard
a "banging and thumping sound" upon his driving of a new car from the
dealer's showroom. The buyer immediately communicated with the dealer
who attempted to correct the condition. The repair was unsuccessful, and
the buyer brought the car back to the dealer. The car was put on the car
rack, but before the mechanic could make the repair (which was a minor
one) the buyer demanded either another new car as a substitute or the
return of his trade-in automobile. The dealer refused, and the buyer
abandoned the car at the dealer's premises where it was later repossessed
by the finance company. The court held that the buyer had accepted the
automobile under section 2-606 and that he could not revoke his accep-
tance unless he was able to show that the non-conformity of the automo-
bile substantially impaired its value to him. The court seemed to say that
100. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
101. Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., Inc., 154 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1967).
102. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959).
103. 209 Pa. Super. 120 (1966).
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there would not be a substantial impairment when relatively minor repairs
could be made to the goods.
A somewhat similar view upholding the dealer's right to cure by
making minor repairs was advanced by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.0 A consumer claimed that his color television set
did not function properly. The sales ticket guaranteed ninety days' free
service and replacement of tubes and parts for one year. He denied the
merchant-dealer any opportunity to inspect the unit in order to determine
whether minor repairs or adjustment would cure the defect, or to replace
the set if the defect could not be cured. The buyer insisted on a replace-
ment set, and when the dealer refused in the absence of being given an
opportunity to inspect it, the buyer attempted to revoke. The court held
in favor of the dealer on the grounds that the buyer never gave the dealer
an adequate opportunity to make a determination of repair or replacement.
The court was really holding that the buyer has a good faith duty to
allow the merchant access to the goods in order that he might make rela-
tively minor repairs under section 2-508. These cases should be contrasted
with Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith,"0 5 in which the automobile
stalled because of a defective transmission minutes after leaving the dealer.
The court was of the view that there was no acceptance by the mere fact
of taking delivery of the car and driving less than a mile before the defect
appeared. The dealer offered to replace the defective transmission by
taking one "of unknown lineage" from another automobile in its showroom
and installing it in the buyer's car. The court held that this was not a
sufficient offer to cure under 2-508, but it would appear that the court
might have ruled in favor of the dealer if it had offered to replace the
defective transmission with a new factory delivered transmission of
"known lineage."
Transmission trouble also plagued the buyer in Sarnecki v. Al Johns
Pontiac." The testimony showed that the transmission was defective and
that the dealer unsuccessfully attempted on a number of occasions to
repair it. After the car had been driven 3,300 miles by the consumer and
the dealer in testing the car after the several repair attempts, the buyer
sought to rescind on the ground that he had requested the installation of
a new transmission after it appeared that the dealer was unable to repair
the original one. The court held that the dealer had breached an implied
warranty of merchantability which was ineffectively disclaimed under the
then standard automobile warranty and disclaimer clause because it was
not so conspicuous as to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability.
In perhaps rare instances the manufacturer's express warranty may
subject it to liability based upon fraud. One complaint alleged that an
automobile manufacturer manufactured cars with an "especially sensitive
104. Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
105. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
106. 56 Luz. Leg. Reg. Repts. 393, 3 U.C.C. Rept. Serv. 1121 (C.P. Luzerne County
1966)
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suspension system" causing extreme vibration and warranted that its
dealers would remedy defects during the warranty period, knowing that
its dealers could not remedy these defects but that they could be corrected
only in the factory. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the
complaint stated a cause of action for fraud on the basis that the warranty
was issued without any intention to perform.1°7
D. Implied Warranties
1. MERCHANTABILITY
When the seller "is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind"
the Code imposes a warranty that the goods are merchantable unless
that warranty is properly disclaimed or modified. 108 The Code articulates
six non-exclusive minimum criteria for determining merchantability,' the
most important for the consumer being that the goods "are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.""' Under this standard,
an air-conditioner that would not cool or a refrigerator which would not
refrigerate at a temperature which may be standard in the industry would
not meet this definition of merchantability."'
2. FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
The warranty of merchantability is often defined as a warranty of
"ordinary use," while a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
'"envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature
of his business.""l12 This latter warranty arises when the seller knows
or has reason to know that the buyer is buying the goods for a particular
purpose and that the buyer is relying upon the seller's supposed skill or
judgment to furnish goods for this purpose. For example, if John Con-
sumer should inform the salesman for Merchants Appliance Company
that he desires to purchase an air-conditioner to cool a room containing
a specified number of cubic feet and the salesman suggests a certain kind
and model air-conditioner which John buys, the warranty for a particular
purpose arises. Conversely, if John fails to inform Merchants of his par-
107. Willard v. Chrysler Corp., 248 S.C. 42, 148 S.E.2d 867 (1966).
108. U.C.C. § 2-314.
109 U.C.C. § 2-314(2):
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, qual-
ity and quantity within each unit among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may re-
quire; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
110. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (c).
111. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 2.
112. U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 2.
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ticular needs, then a warranty of merchantability would be imposed but
a warranty for a particular purpose might not be. The hypothetical prob-
lem states that John informs Merchants Appliance of his needs. There
need not be an overt communication if John is able to show that Merchants
had "reason to know" of his requirements. For example, if Merchants
had sold air-conditioners to John's neighbors in the same project develop-
ment, a case could be made that Merchants had reason to know. Insofar
as the refrigerator is concerned, if John should inform the salesman that
he wanted a refrigerator which would keep meats frozen for so many
days, then Merchants would incur this warranty duty if they recommended
a certain brand and model and John relied upon this advice.
Prior to the Code, if John should insist upon a certain trade name
brand of air-conditioner there could not be a warranty for a particular
purpose because John's insistence would show that there was no reliance
on Merchants Appliance Company. This logical rule was extended some-
what illogically to cases where John might go to a dealer who dealt solely
in goods made by one manufacturer, the purchase of patent or trade name
items from a dealer who sold only one line being deemed sufficient to
show that John did not rely."' The Code has perpetuated part of the rule;
if John insists upon a particular brand then he is not relying upon the
dealer. However, the mere fact that John purchases a trade name item
from a dealer who deals solely in that trade name item (or from a dealer
who deals in many different trade name items) will not be sufficient in
itself to show that John did not rely upon the supposed expertise of the
dealer who has recommended one particular model based upon John's
expressed or implied needs. The trade name purchase is only one facet
of reliance to be considered by the trier of fact.'14
3. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF AND CONFLICT BETWEEN WARRANTIES
The Code succinctly states, 1 5
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such con-
struction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall deter-
mine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention
the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsis-
tent sample or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent
general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied war-
ranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose.
113. UNrFORM SALES ACT § 15(4). See L. VOLD, SALES 437-443 (2d ed. 1951).
114. U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 5.
115. U.C.C. § 2-317.
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The Comment to this section expressly engrafts the good faith limi-
tation on the use of this apparently mechanical test of determining inten-
tion, stating,116
These rules of intention are to be applied only where factors
making for an equitable estoppel of the seller do not exist and
where he has in perfect good faith made warranties which later
turn out to be inconsistent. To the extent that the seller has led
the buyer to believe that all of the warranties can be performed,
he is estopped from setting up any essential inconsistency as a
defense.
The Comment further expresses the view that "these rules are not
absolute" and that a court may refuse to use the Code tests if it would
result in an inconsistent or unreasonable construction of the agreement." 7
In our original hypothetical problem, Merchants Appliance Company
has made affirmations of fact to John Consumer to the effect that the
air-conditioner will cool so many cubic feet at so many degrees and that
Merchants will repair all defects within one year after installation. The
air-conditioner is delivered and installed, and John receives a copy of
the factory warranty (which is adopted by Merchants). This warranty
provides for repair for only the first ninety days and states that this unit
is not proper for the size of the room in which it was installed. A court
should hold that the express factory warranty which negates the use of
this unit in John's bedroom does not negate the dealer's implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose which was created by express affirma-
tion. It is to be noted that an express affirmation of fact will not only
constitute an express warranty, but it can also be treated as a part of
the basis of the bargain, creating an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose which will survive an inconsistent express warranty.1
Insofar as the inconsistency between the "service periods" stated in the
factory warranty (adopted by the dealer) and the dealer's oral affirmation
or promise is concerned, it would seem that Merchants has led John to
believe that the unit had a one-year service period and should be estopped
from claiming the shorter period under the written warranty. This is
particularly true in the ordinary case in which the consumer never sees
the written warranty until the unit ,is delivered and installed in his house.
4. DISCLAIMERS OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF QUALITY AND DAMAGES
The disclaimer and modification of warranty sections of the Code
were seemingly designed to forbid sellers from creating traps for unwary
buyers. In certain cases they have been construed as a trap for sellers
who do not carefully track the provisions.
A written agreement which attempts to disclaim or modify the
116. U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 2.
117. U.C.C. § 2-317, Comment 3.
118. U.C.C. § 2-317(c).
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implied warranty of merchantability must mention the word "merchant-
ability" and the exclusion or modifying language must be conspicuous. 19
The question of whether a term or clause is conspicuous is a question to
be decided by the judge, not by the jury.120 The two tests of "conspicuous-
ness" are whether the term or clause is "so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it" and whether
the wording contained in the body of the agreement is printed "in larger
or other contrasting type or color."' 21 The Comments note that the "test
is whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it.' 1 22 This
Comment was of controlling importance in the case of Hunt v. Perkins
Machinery Co., Inc.123 The seller's printed purchase order forms were
printed in pad form with the copies separated by carbon paper, and the
buyer did not receive a copy of the form until after he signed it. The
face of the form stated that the "Order and Its Acceptance are Subject
to 'Terms and Conditions' Stated in This Order,' 24 and these words were
in boldface conspicuous type. The rear of the form contained a disclaimer
in conspicuous language which disclaimed the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The court stated
that if the disclaiming language had appeared on the face of the form it
would have met the Code's test. However, the attention of the buyer
was not called to the reverse side of the form, and therefore the disclaimer
was not "conspicuous" within the meaning of the Comment quoted above.
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded
in writing which is conspicuous. A clause to the effect that "there are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof" is
sufficient to exclude the warranty of fitness. 5 The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., Inc. 2 6 was
confronted with a pre-Code transaction in which a new car warranty
furnished by the manufacturer provided that it was "in lieu of all other
warranties.' 1 21 The court held that under pre-Code law the quoted lan-
guage was sufficient to exclude an alleged warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose and that this rule was continued under the Code. The
court's statement about the effect of section 2-316 of the Code was dicta;
however, this dicta refused to follow the dicta in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 28 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
the standard automobile warranty which purportedly attempted to dis-
claim all implied warranties would not be given effect because it was
deemed unconscionable. The Virginia court felt that if section 2-316
119. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
120. U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
121. Id.
122. U.C.C. § 1-201, Comment 10.
123. 352 Mass. 535, 226 N.E.2d 228 (1967).
124. Id. at 536-37, 226 N.E.2d at 229.
125. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
126. 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967).
127. 207 Va. 972, 973, 154 S.E.2d 140, 141 (1967).
128. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959).
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allows a disclaimer, then it is a fallacy to say that the disclaimer is
unconscionable. There is a superficially appealing logic in the Virginia
view if section 2-316 is approached in a factual vacuum. However, con-
sidering that the standard car warranty is a contract of adhesion in
which the consumer buyer has no power to bargain for any of its terms,
that all car manufacturers use similar language to exclude implied war-
ranties and that the average car buyer does not even receive the warranty
until days after he takes possession of the car, then should not this dis-
claimer in conjunction with the total factual pattern be deemed uncon-
scionable in accordance with the New Jersey view?
The rather clear effect of the above rules is seriously limited by the
following rule: 129
Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expression like "as is," "with all faults"
or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty.
It is interesting to observe that a Comment requires the above
exclusionary language to be in conspicuous print,'130 but the Code itself
fails to require it. A Comment notes that this language is a common
factual situation "in which the circumstances surrounding the transaction
are in themselves sufficient to call the buyer's attention to the fact that
no implied warranties are made or that a certain implied warranty is
being excluded.'' It is suggested that the "as is" or "with all faults"
language is usually present in the sale of second-hand goods rather than
in the sale of new consumer goods; hence it should be of little concern
to the average consumer. A consumer buyer of second-hand goods will
be deprived of any economic protection as a result of his dealer's use of
this language, but if personal injury results from a defect in the goods
which was known to the seller he may well be liable under a deceit or
negligence theory. 3'
The consumer buyer may also be denied any implied warranty pro-
tection in the event that he examines the goods before entering into the
contract (or refuses to examine them) "with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.' 3 3
Latent defects are, by their nature, of a kind which would not be apparent
in the ordinary examination and will not be excluded under this rule. 34
129. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (a).
130. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 4. Compare the wording of subsections 2 and 3 of § 2-316
as to the question of conspicuous print; subsection 3 applies "notwithstanding subsection (2)."
131. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 6.
132. E.g., Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co., 35 L.W. 2525 (Wash. 1967); see also
U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3. There may be a warranty of merchantability in Florida when
second hand goods are sold by a dealer in these goods. Enix v. Diamond T. Sales & Service
Co., 188 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
133. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b).
134. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
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Further, a consumer will be held to the knowledge of a consumer and
"will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a layman
might be expected to observe."'3 5 In order for the seller to claim that
the buyer refused to examine the goods, the goods not only have to be
available for inspection but the dealer must "demand" that the buyer
examine them.136 Let us assume that John Consumer examines an air-
conditioner and refrigerator before he agrees to buy them pursuant to
Merchant's demand, and that during the course of his examination he
raises certain objections or asks certain questions. Merchants Appliance
Company will most likely make statements to overcome these objections
or to answer these questions. If John indicates clearly that he is relying
on these statements rather than on his examination, these statements will
give rise to express warranties including an express warranty of merchant-
ability."7 In this latter case, Merchants Appliance Company may give
more warranties than it intended to do when it "demanded" that John
examine the goods.
In addition to or in lieu of disclaiming warranties, the dealer may
provide in his sales contract for a liquidation of damages, a limitation
on their amount, a contractual modification of the remedy, or a combina-
tion of all three. 38
The Code's articulation of the liquidated damage concept, as follows,
seems to be of doubtful utility in the consumer breach of warranty area:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light
of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasi-
bility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.'39
If one refers to the italicized words above, there would seem little
likelihood of a seller's fixing "unreasonably large liquidated damages"
in the typical seller's form sales contract. However, if the seller should
fix an unreasonaby small amount as liquidated damage it may be stricken
on the grounds of unconscionability.'40 The liquidated damage rules of
section 2-718 seem designed for merchants' sales to other merchants rather
than to consumers.
Of much greater utility in the consumer area is the rule that the
parties may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided for in article 2 and may limit or alter the amount of
damages, as by "limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods
and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of the non-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. U.C.C. § 2-316(4).
139. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (emphasis added).
140. U.C.C. § 2-718, Comment 1.
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conforming goods or parts."'' The seller must expressly state in the sales
contract that any contractual modification of the buyer's remedies is
"exclusive;" otherwise the buyer has the option to resort to the con-
tractual remedy or the remedies given by the Code or both.142 Let us
assume that Merchants Appliance Company has sold a refrigerator to
John Consumer. The form sales contract provides that Merchants agrees
to "repair and replace defective parts in the unit at its expense for a
period of ninety days and that the parties agree that Merchants Appliance
Company will not be liable for damages for loss of use of the unit, for
loss of food as a result of failure of the compressing unit and for personal
injuries or death resulting from defects in the refrigerator, and that the
buyer's remedies are exclusively as described in this contract." There
seems little question that courts should uphold this clause as barring the
buyer from recovering for loss of use of the refrigerator and for loss of
food through spoilage on the ground that the seller has properly limited
his liability for consequential damages.143 A court can, however, deem
that this limitation of consequential damages for economic loss is un-
conscionable upon consideration of the totality of the factual pattern of
the transaction.
Assuming that a short circuit in the refrigerator caused injury or
death of John Consumer or members of his household, 44 the Code provides
that limitations of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, 45 and courts should
have little difficulty in invalidating these clauses. However, if Merchants
Appliance Company should couple this limitation on consequential dam-
age clause with a proper disclaimer of warranty clause,'46 then it may
escape liability entirely unless the court follows Henningsen141 and invali-
dates the disclaimer on the grounds of unconscionability or ignores the
Code entirely and proceeds under section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts.148
The damage discussion under the express warranty of title section
of this article is applicable to breach of warranties of quality when there
is no contractual limitation of damages. 49
E. Rejection, Acceptance and Revocation of Acceptance for
Breach of Warranty
In the ordinary retail sale of appliances or other large, bulky items
from showroom display models, the buyer will not receive the identical
141. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a).
142. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b).
143. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
144. U.C.C. § 2-318.
145. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
146. U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 3.
147. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959).
148. See R. DUESENBERO & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS § 7.06 (1966); Note,
Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 917 (1966).
149. See page 25 supra.
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appliance which he examined prior to making the purchase; the purchased
goods will be withdrawn from stock and will be (hopefully) the same
as the examined model. Sometime after the purchase is made, the appli-
ances will be delivered to the buyer, and, at that time, he has the following
three alternatives open to him regarding any breach of warranty: he may
reject, accept under protest, or revoke his acceptance.
1. REJECTION
If we assume that a tender of delivery is made of the air-conditioner
and refrigerator in our hypothetical problem, John Consumer may reject
the goods if the defect is an obvious one which he discerns upon tender.
However, even after the goods have been delivered he has a reasonable
time in which to ascertain that there is a defect and to notify the seller
of this fact.150 John Consumer must take affirmative action to avoid being
held to have accepted the goods.15' After John has notified Merchants
Appliance Company of the defect within a reasonable time, John may
not use the appliances because this may be considered as an exercise of
ownership and wrongful as to the seller. 1 2 If John has not paid any
part of the purchase price (an unlikely event except in the case of
department store charge accounts), he must hold them with reasonable
care for a sufficient time to give the seller an opportunity to remove
them.'53 If John has paid part or all of the purchase price of the defective
goods, he has a security interest in the goods for the amount paid plus
expenses incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and
custody, and he may hold the goods and then sell them.'54
John Consumer's right to reject will be limited in some cases by the
right of Merchants Appliance Company to "cure" the defect. This cure
concept (which will be discussed in a subsequent sub-section 5 ) is the
underlying basis for the rule that the buyer who rejects because of a
"particular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection" 5 6
must state this defect to the seller. Buyers are precluded from relying
upon unstated defects to justify rejection and from relying upon them
as a breach of the contract of sale in any case where the seller could have
cured the defects had he been seasonably notified of them. The consumer
buyer may give a quick and informal notice of defects at the time of
tender which does not mislead the seller.' 57 A buyer who rejects without
articulating his objections is "probably acting in commercial bad faith
and seeking to get out of a deal which has become unprofitable." 58 It is
150. U.C.C. § 2-601(1).
151. U.C.C. § 2-601, Comment 1.
152. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a).
153. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b).
154. U.C.C. §§ 2-602(b) and 2-711(3).
155. See page 41 infra.
156. U.C.C. § 2-605(1).
157. U.C.C. § 2-605, Comment 1.
158. U.C.C. § 2-605, Comment 2.
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believed that this rule should not cause hardships to consumers because
it reflects the fact that most dissatisfied consumers will express their dis-
satisfaction with their purchases in a most specific way.
2. ACCEPTANCE AND ITS EFFECTS
The right to reject a non-conforming tender and the notion of
acceptance are linked together because a buyer who fails to reject within
a reasonable time after he has had an opportunity to inspect them will
be deemed to have accepted the goods. 5 9 As a result, consumers should be
cautioned to make an examination of the goods as soon as possible after
they have received the goods; any unexcused slumbering on their rights
may prove costly. In a similar vein, if the buyer signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will keep them in spite of their
non-conformity, these verbal acts will also constitute an acceptance. 160
Although it is not required by the Code,'" it is suggested that a buyer
who is willing to accept in spite of the non-conformity of the goods should
notify the seller in writing that the acceptance is to be considered without
prejudice to the buyer's right to sue for damages and without prejudice
to the seller's duty to cure the defects. This suggestion is based upon the
idea of building a record for any possible litigation which may result. 6 '
Finally, if the consumer buyer does "any act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership" it may constitute an acceptance only if ratified by the seller.' 3
It would seem that a consumer buyer's use of defective consumer goods
could constitute an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership rights and
be deemed an acceptance. Of more importance, perhaps, is the fact that
if the use of the defective goods resulted in property loss (e.g., spoilage
of frozen foods in a refrigerator which was used in spite of a defective
cooling mechanism) or in personal injury (e.g., a short circuit in the
wiring which caused electrocution of a user) the seller could avoid liability
under the theory that consumer user could have avoided the harm by
not using the defective goods. 6 4
The buyer may not reject goods after he has accepted them nor
may he revoke his acceptance if he accepted the goods with knowledge
of the non-conformity unless his acceptance was "on the reasonable
assumption that the non-conformity would be seasonably cured."'16 The
buyer must pay the sales price for accepted goods; however, the accept-
ance does not impair the buyer's rights to damages for defects if the buyer
notifies the seller of the defects within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered them. Insofar as consumers are concerned, a
159. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b).
160. U.C.C. § 2-606(1) (a).
161. U.C.C. § 2-601 and Comments; U.C.C. § 1-207, Comment 2.
162. See U.C.C. § 1-207.
163. U.C.C. § 2-606(1) (c).
164. U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8.
165. U.C.C. § 2-607(2).
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reasonable time for notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith
and not to deprive a consumer of his remedy. Hence a consumer buyer
will have a longer period of time in which to notify the seller than will
a merchant buyer.'66 The Comments draw an important distinction be-
tween the degree of specificity required in the "rejection" notice given to
the seller and the notice required under the acceptance concept. 1' It is
enough for the buyer to inform the seller that "the transaction is still
troublesome," and he need not claim damages or threaten litigation. It
is designed to open the way for settlement through negotiation which
would include cure by the seller, reduction of the purchase price, etc.' 68
The Code states that the burden of proof is on the buyer to establish
any breach in regard to accepted goods.6 9 However, the Comments ex-
plain that this "burden of proof" is purely a procedural matter allowing
the buyer to file a counter-claim for damages when sued for the price
or to sue for "recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price." '
3. REVOCATION OP ACCEPTANCE
The Code has introduced a new concept of revocation of acceptance
in place of the former theory of rescission (with its varying meanings)
and has added the rule that the buyer may revoke and also claim damages.
He need not elect between these two remedies. 7 In general, the buyer
may revoke his acceptance when the known non-conformity of the goods
substantially impairs its value to him, and when he reasonably assumed
that the non-conformity would be seasonably cured but it has not been.
In the event that he accepted the goods without knowledge of the non-
conformity, "if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances" he
may also revoke. 2 The ambiguous italicized words are explained as
meaning language used in the contract, explicit language used at the time
of delivery, or in the "circumstances" of the case, which induce the buyer
in delaying discovery of the defects. 3
In accord with the rejection and acceptance rules, the buyer must
revoke his acceptance within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered the non-conformity and "before any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own de-
fects."'1 74 The quoted words should have little importance in the average
consumer goods purchase of non-perishable commodities. The revocation
is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller. The "reasonable" time
166. U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
167. U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
168. Id.
169. U.C.C. § 2-607(4).
170. U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 6.
171. U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 1.
172. U.C.C. § 2-608(l)(b).
173. U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 3.
174. U.C.C. § 2-608(2).
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limitation in this revocation rule will ordinarily start running only after
the buyer has attempted adjustment with the seller who has refused or
failed to cure or reduce the price. 7 ' An underlying policy dictates that
the buyer ought to give the seller notice as quickly as possible in order
for the seller to make adjustments. Hence a good faith consumer buyer
who attempts to revoke his acceptance but fails to itemize specifically
all of the defects may not be bound by his original revocation which does
not mislead the seller and prevent him from making a reasonable adjust-
ment.1
76
A buyer who revokes his acceptance rather than rejecting upon tender
of delivery is not penalized for his forebearance. He has the same rights
and duties as if he had rejected the goods." 7
4. THE SELLER'S RIGHT TO CURE AND THE BUYER'S RIGHT TO
ADEQUATE ASSURANCE
One consistent thread runs throughout the Code sections dealing
with rejection, acceptance and revocation of acceptance: the buyer's right
to utilize these steps is conditioned upon the seller's right to "cure" the
defects. These reciprocal rights and duties are so well coordinated that
they should result in satisfactory adjustment of quality disputes without
litigation. This is particularly important in the consumer area where the
amounts involved often make litigation impractical.
The Code carefully distinguishes between the seller's right to cure
before the contract period of delivery and after this period. In the former
case, when the time for performance has not elapsed and the buyer rejects
the goods because of non-conformity, the seller may notify the buyer that
he intends to cure. The seller must then make a conforming delivery
within this contract period. The seller has this right of cure even when
he has picked up the goods and refunded the purchase price; he can
still make another tender of conforming goods within the period of the
contract.7 8 It is doubted that this right of cure will have much practical
utility in the sale of consumer goods. John Consumer's contract of sale
with Merchants Appliance will usually have no specific date of tender;
in fact, the date of tender is ordinarily set by the tender itself.
However, the Code also provides that when the buyer rejects a
non-conforming tender "which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe
would be acceptable," the seller then has a further reasonable time to
substitute a conforming tender if he seasonably notifies the buyer of his
intention to do so.' 79 The italicized words may be troublesome to apply.
For example, assume that Merchants Appliance Company delivers an
air-conditioner and a refrigerator to John Consumer. John uses these
175. U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 4.
176. U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 5.
177. U.C.C. § 2-608(3).
178. U.C.C. § 2-508(1) and Comment 1.
179. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (emphasis added).
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units for a few days, and both of them prove to be defective. Merchants
Appliance sold these appliances in good faith and without knowledge of
the defects-does this constitute reasonable grounds to believe that the
goods would be acceptable? The Comments state that reasonable grounds
to believe can be found in the prior course of dealing between the parties
(if any), a course of performance between the parties (e.g., these two
appliances were one installment of a number of appliances purchased
under one contract from Merchants, defects had appeared in the other
appliances and cure was made), or usage of the trade, "as well as in the
particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.' 180
If we assume that there have not been any prior dealings between
the parties or course of performance between them, we are then faced
with the "usage of the trade" concept. The Code defines a usage of
trade as' 8 '
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be
proved as facts.
It is to be observed that a trade usage does not have to be of ancient
or immemorial origin. On the contrary, "full recognition is thus available
for new usages and for usages currently observed by the great majority
of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not
agree.'18 2 Under this standard, Merchants can prove that the majority
of "decent dealers" in the place of the sale "stand behind" the sale of
their trade name appliances. Further, the usage in the appliance trade
could be for dealers to make an inspection of their appliances when they
are uncrated upon delivery from their suppliers, and based upon his
inspection and prior experience with this make of air-conditioner and
refrigerator the merchant had reasonable grounds to believe that they
would be acceptable to the buyer.
It is true that a court which is hostile to this notion of cure may
construe the words "reasonable grounds to believe" as being limited to
cases where the seller knows that his tender does not conform exactly
with the terms of the contract but believes in good faith that the substitute
goods are as good as or better than those called for by the contract. This
latter interpretation would deprive this healthy cure rule of all effect.
On the other hand, a sympathetic application of the cure rule will protect
the good faith buyer (who is not stubbornly insisting upon his rights to
revoke his acceptance and to sue for damages) and will protect the good
faith seller who is trying to give the buyer the benefit of his bargain. A
classic illustration of the full use of this principle occurred in a recent
180. U.C.C. § 2-508, Comment 2.
181. U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
182. U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 5.
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case involving the sale of a hearing aid.' A buyer sought to purchase
a certain model hearing aid which had been recommended to him. How-
ever, the dealer sold an improved but modified version of the desired
hearing aid. The buyer was not satisfied and returned it upon discovering
that he had not received the model he had requested. The dealer and
the manufacturer explained the facts to the buyer and stated that they
were willing to supply the model originally requested by him, but the
buyer refused and demanded the return of his money. The court held
that the time for performance had expired, but that the seller had reason-
able cause to believe that the new model would be satisfactory to the
buyer who was not entitled to reject under section 2-601 of the Code.
This cure rule presents another problem of interpretation. The
section speaks of the buyer's rejecting a non-conforming tender-does
this confine the cure to the rejection stage, or may it also be applied in
the event that the buyer revokes his acceptance? If a court looks at this
section with tunnel vision, it cannot be applied upon revocation of
acceptance. However, as previously stated, a buyer who properly revokes
his acceptance "has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them,"' 84 and this would logically give the
seller the right to cure.
Again, if we approach the cure rule with tunnel vision we would say
that the seller's right to cure is (unless covered under a warranty or
guaranty for repair for a performance period) limited to replacement
of defective goods rather than repair. The wording and respective Com-
ments of section 2-508 and sections 2-601 to 2-608 fail to hint that the
notion of cure includes the idea of repair. Fortunately, a Comment to
section 2-510 recognizes that cure may consist of repossession of the
tendered goods and a new tender and also "changes in goods already
tendered, such as repair, partial substitution, sorting out from an improper
mixture and the like."' 85 Admittedly section 2-510 is directed to the
question of who bears the risk of loss to the goods when there is a breach
(the "risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance")
rather than to the basic right to cure. This view that repair is encompassed
within the idea of cure is further developed in a Comment to section
2-609 which deals with insecurity and adequate assurance, "where a
delivery has defects, even though easily curable, which interfere with
easy use by the buyer, no verbal assurance can be deemed adequate
which is not accompanied by replacement, repair, money-allowance or
other commercially reasonable cure."' 6 It would be illogical to construe
the right to cure as having one meaning in the "cure" section and a
different meaning in other sections of the Code. Further, it would be
183. Bartus v. Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Utica City Ct. 1967); 4 U.C.C.
Reporting Service 845.
184. U.C.C. § 2-608(3).
185. U.C.C. § 2-510, Comment 2.
186. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
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even more illogical to assume that the draftsmen of the Code meant to
confine cure to replacement of the goods exclusive of repair, as this would
ignore the long established commercial practice of repairing (including
replacement of parts) rather than complete replacement of the unit.
As previously indicated in the cure rules relative to a breach of war-
ranty of title, the right of the seller to cure is coupled with the right of
the buyer to demand adequate assurance that the seller will cure in a
proper manner. 187 To apply this adequate assurance rule to our cure rule
let us assume that John Consumer's air-conditioner and refrigerator have
failed after a few days of use. John notifies Merchants Appliance Com-
pany that he has revoked his acceptance. Merchants then telephones John
that it intends to repair the two appliances within the following week. If
John has reservations about the worth of this oral promise, he may write
to Merchants and demand adequate written assurance that it will perform
within the following week. It is suggested that John specify in his written
demand for adequate assurance that Merchants must reply within a set
period (five days for example), otherwise it would appear that Merchants
would have a "reasonable time not exceeding thirty days"' 88 in which to
give the written assurance, and this would exceed the time promised by
Merchants to repair the appliance.
If John Consumer should hear reports from his friends and neigh-
bors that Merchants Appliance has delivered defective goods to others
and that Merchants' promises have not been performed, then John would
have cause to demand more than mere written assurance and, in the exer-
cise of good faith, he would be justified in demanding replacement rather
than repair of the appliances. 9 In brief, the question of what is adequate
must be determined by a consideration of the required good faith of the
parties, commercial standards in the trade, solvency of the seller, etc.
In the event that Merchants Appliance Company should fail to pro-
vide adequate assurance within the period reasonably fixed by John in
his written demand, this will constitute "a repudiation of the contract"
by Merchants.'1 This repudiation involves the application of the Code's
articulation of repudiation and the right of the repudiator to retract his
repudiation. In the stated problem, John, upon failure to receive the ade-
quate assurance, should inform Merchants by letter that he considers its
repudiation as final' 9' and that he intends to bring suit for damages. 9 2
Unless John takes these steps, Merchants may retract its repudiation un-
less John has "materially changed his position"'93 or has "cancelled" the
contract. 94 Cancellation occurs when "either party puts an end to the con-
187. U.C,C. § 2-609.
188. U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
189. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
190. U.C.C. § 2-609(4).
191. U.C.C. § 2-611(1).
192. U.C.C. § 2-610(b).
193. U.C.C. § 2-611(1).
194. U.C.C.'§§ 2-610(1) and 2-106(4).
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tract for breach by the other, and ... the cancelling party also retains any
remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance."' 95
There would seem to be no real difference between "cancelling" for a
breach and considering that the seller's repudiation is final in our hypo-
thetical problem. The material change in position could occur if John
should "cover" by purchasing an air-conditioner and refrigerator from
another dealer, and the Code encourages buyers (both consumers and
merchants) to cover.'96 Although it is not literally required, it is suggested
that consumer buyers who have changed their position by "cover" should
give repudiating sellers notice of this fact in order to reduce the possibility
of litigation by sellers who may claim that they have retracted the repudi-
ation and that the buyer has not changed his position in fact.
John Consumer has still another possibility open to him-he may
"for a commercially reasonable time await performance" by Merchants,
assuming that he may make do with his old air-conditioner and refrig-
erator until the matter is settled.'97 In this event, John should notify
Merchants by letter that he expects it to retract its repudiation and to
give adequate assurance that it will effectuate replacement or the neces-
sary repairs to the appliances. Again, John should give Merchants a rea-
sonable "deadline" for the retraction and the providing of adequate
assurance, and, if these are not forthcoming, he can then proceed in ac-
cordance with the prior discussion.
VII. THE GOOD FAITH BUYER VIS A VIS THE TRUE OWNER, HOLDER OF A
SECURITY INTEREST OR THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
Generations of property professors have waxed fond of the rights of
an owner of goods to recover them or their value from a bona fide pur-
chaser who purchased them from a vendor who had less than full title to
the goods. The Code has changed much of this professional lore.
Let us assume that John Consumer has purchased a used stove from
Ned Neighbor. Ned Neighbor purchased the stove recently from a mer-
chant. Ned Neighbor paid for the stove with a check which was subse-
quently dishonored. Before the merchant could repossess the stove, John
Consumer purchased it in good faith from Ned Neighbor. Under the Code,
Ned Neighbor has voidable title but the transfer to John Consumer gives
him good title and cuts off the interest of the merchant. 9 If Ned Neigh-
bor should purchase the same stove by impersonating someone else and
give a bad check in payment, or agree to pay for the stove later with title
to remain in the merchant, John Consumer will still obtain good title by
his bona fide purchase. Even though Ned Neighbor's conduct could be
195. U.C.C. § 2-106(4).
196. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 and 2-712, Comment 4.
197. U.C.C. § 2-610(a).
198. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (b) and (c).
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classified as larcenous under the criminal law, he has the power to pass on
good title to a bona fide purchaser.199
The Code's protections of John Consumer extend further than just
the casual buying of goods from a neighbor. If John Consumer should
purchase a used television set from a dealer in new and used television
sets, jewelry from a jeweler who sells used jewelry, furniture from a
used furniture dealer, etc., he will obtain good title if he is a buyer in
ordinary course of business even though these goods were entrusted to the
merchant for storage or repair by the true owners. 00 In order to be a buyer
in the ordinary course of business, John Consumer must buy, in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the
ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods, from a
"person in the business of selling goods of that kind.' 20 1
The Code's protection to John Consumer extends into the purchase of
used consumer goods which are subject to a security interest created by
the non-merchant vendor. Assume that John Consumer purchases some
household appliances from his neighbor, Ned Neighbor. Ned Neighbor
purchased these appliances from Merchants Appliance Company under a
purchase money security interest. Merchants Appliance Company did not
file a financing statement20 2 with the Clerk of the Circuit Court.20 3 The
Code provides that purchase money security interests in consumer goods
are perfected without filing a financing statement.2 04 However, if John Con-
sumer purchased these household appliances without knowledge of Mer-
chants Appliance Company's security interest and for his own personal,
family or household purposes he will take free of this un-filed security
interest.2°5 Of course, if Credit Appliance Company filed its financing
statement, John Consumer will take subject to it.2 6
The Code has continued the protections articulated in the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act 20 7 which are designed to protect the buyer in the
ordinary course of business from claims by inventory suppliers claiming
a security interest. Assume that John Consumer purchased a refrigerator
and air-conditioner for cash from Merchants Appliance Company. Mer-
chants Appliance Company had purchased these goods from the manu-
facturer, and the sale was financed by Fabulous Factors which filed a
financing statement evidencing a purchase money security agreement.
This security agreement states that Merchants shall not sell these goods
without the written permission of Fabulous Factors. John Consumer may
purchase these appliances free from the security interest of Fabulous Fac-
199. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (a), (b) and (d).
200. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) and (3).
201. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
202. U.C.C. § 9-402.
203. U.C.C. § 9-401.
204. U.C.C. § 9-302(d).
205. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
206. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
207. UNIF om TRUST RECETPTS AcT § 9(2) (a) and (c).
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tors even though he knows of the existence of this floor plan agreement,
provided, however, that he does not know that the written permission of
Fabulous Factors is needed for his purchase. 08 John Consumer must be a
buyer in ordinary course of business-he will be even if he knows of the
existence of the security agreement but he will not be if he further knows
that his purchase is in contravention of some provision contained in the
security agreement.2"9
The consumer is concerned not only with the quality of the goods,
claims of title of third persons and claims by security interest holders, but
also with possible federal tax liens. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966210
has created protections for the consumer in two separate areas. If John
Consumer should purchase appliances from Merchants Appliance Com-
pany after a federal tax lien is filed against Merchants, John Consumer is
protected by a "superpriority status" against the government provided
that he had no knowledge of the filing of the lien.2 11 Prior to this legisla-
tion, the I.R.S. could have, at least in theory, levied on these goods in the
hands of John Consumer.
This same act has given more limited protections to John if he
should happen to buy a used refrigerator from his neighbor, Ned Neigh-
bor. There are three qualifications to this protective rule: (a) John Con-
sumer must not have actual knowledge of the existence of the tax lien;
(b) the sales price must be less than two hundred fifty dollars; and (c)
it must be a "casual" sale, i.e., this particular sale must not be one sale in
a series of sales.212 For example, if Ned Neighbor is merely selling one
thing-the refrigerator-this would be a casual sale. However, if John
Consumer knows that Ned Neighbor is selling all of his goods in a "series
of sales," this would not qualify as a casual sale.
SECURITY INTERESTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Code is intended to apply to any transaction regard-
less of its form which is intended to create a security interest in personal
property or fixtures.213 The article primarily articulates rules defining
rights of a secured party against persons dealing with the debtor. It
does not 214
208. U.CC. § 9-307(1).
209. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
210. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
211. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(b) (3).
212. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (b) (4). For further discussion of the Tax Lien Act,
see Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HAxv. L. REV. 1369 (1968); Plumb, The New
Federal Tax Lien Law-Part 1, 13 PRAc. LAW 63 (1967); 4 C.C.H. 1966 STAND. Fm. TAX
REP. 54 (Dec. 21, 1966).
213. U.C.C..§ 9-102(1) (a).
214. U.C.C. § 9-102(3) Note. See also §§ 9-201, 203(2) Note; 1-103, 104; 2-102.
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prescribe regulations and controls which may be necessary to
curb abuses arising in the small loan business or in the financing
of consumer purchases on credit. Accordingly there is no inten-
tion to repeal existing regulatory acts in those fields.
Many states have legislated in the retail consumer credit area with
varying degrees of success varying from the consumer loaded approach
of Maryland21 to the rather vacuous approach of Florida.210 This diver-
sity of approach was one of the reasons for the draftsmen of the Code to
abstain from any thorough, pin-pointed regulation of consumer credit.
This abstention has given rise to a demand for adoption of state truth-in-
lending laws and other consumer oriented protective legislation.217 Part
of this demand has been met by the recent adoption of the Federal Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act.2
18
II. FEDERAL CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 was enacted to
enhance strengthened competition between financial institutions and other
firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit by requiring a "mean-
ingful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to com-
pare more readily the various terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit. 2 1 9 In order to accomplish these objectives, the
Act requires that a creditor2 2 1 who extends consumer credit 221 under
finance charges222 shall disclose clearly and conspicuously certain required
information to the consumer.2
The Act creates a triptych of consumer credit transactions and sets
out specific rules for each.
215. Stride v. Martin, 184 Md. 446, 41 A.2d 489 (1945).
216. FLA. STAT. §§ 520.12 and 520.39 (1967).
217. See THE LAW AND THE Low INCOME CONSUMER (C. Katz ed. 1968) ; Johnson, Regu-
lation of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MIcH. L. REV. (1967); Jordan
and Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLum. L. Rav. 387 (1968); Ziegel,
Consumer Credit Regulation: A Canadian Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLuM. L. REV.
488 (1968). See also Ortioue, Too Little, Too Late?, 14 CATH. LAW. 153, 157 (1968).
218. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 5.
219. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 102.
220. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 103(f):
The term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for
the extension of, credit for which payment of a finance charge is required, whether
in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise. The provisions
of this title apply to any such creditor, irrespective of his or its status as a natural
person or any type of organization.
221. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 103(e) and (h):
(e) The term "credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer
payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.
(h) The adjective "consumer," used with reference to a credit transaction, char-
acterizes the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or
extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household, or agri-
cultural purposes.
222. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 106:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of the finance
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A. Open End Consumer Credit Plans
The open end credit plan is defined as a plan "prescribing the terms
of credit transactions which may be made thereunder from time to time
and under the terms of which a finance charge may be computed on the
outstanding unpaid balance from time to time thereunder.1 224 This plan
would seem to signify the "revolving budget plan" or "revolving charge
charge in connection with any consumer credit transaction shall be determined as
the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident
to the extension of credit, including any of the following types of charges which are
applicable:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a point,
discount, or other system of additional charges.
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting
the creditor against the obligor's default or other credit loss.
(b) Charges or premiums for credit life, accident, or health insurance written
in connection with any consumer credit transaction shall be included in the finance
charge unless:
(1) the coverage of the debtor by the insurance is not a factor in the ap-
proval by the creditor of the extension of credit, and this fact is clearly disclosed
in writing to the person applying for or obtaining the extension of credit; and(2) in order to obtain the insurance in connection with extension of credit,
the person to whom the credit is extended must give specific affirmative written
indication of his desire to do so after written disclosure to him of the cost thereof.
(c) Charges or premiums for insurance, written in connection with any con-
sumer credit transaction, against loss of or damage to property or against liability
arising out of the ownership or use of property, shall be included in the finance
charge unless a clear and specific statement in writing is furnished by the creditor
to the person to whom the credit is extended, setting forth the cost of the insur-
ance if obtained from or through the creditor, and stating that the person to whom
the credit is extended may choose the person through which the insurance is to be
obtained.
(d) If any of the following items is itemized and disclosed in accordance with the
regulations of the Board in connection with any transaction, then the creditor need
not include that item in the computation of the finance charge with respect to that
transaction:
(1) Fees and charges prescribed by law which actually are or will be paid
to public officials for determining the existence of or for perfecting or releasing or
satisfying any security related to the credit transaction.
(2) The premium payable for any insurance in lieu of perfecting any secu-
rity interest otherwise required by the creditor in connection with the transaction, if
the premium does not exceed the fees and charges described in paragraph (1) which
would otherwise be payable.
(3) Taxes.
(4) Any other type of charge which is not for credit and the exclusion of
which from the finance charge is approved by the Board by regulation.
(e) The following items, when charged in connection with any extension of
credit secured by an interest in real property, shall not be included in the compu-
tation of the finance charge with respect to that transaction:
(1) Fees or premiums for title examination, title insurance, or similar
purposes.
(2) Fees for preparation of a deed, settlement statement, or other docu-
ments.
(3) Escrow for future payments of taxes and insurance.
(4) Fees for notarizing deeds and other documents.
(5) Appraisal fees.
(6) Credit reports.
223. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 121.
224. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 103(i).
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account" so popular in department store circles. The creditor is obligated
before opening an open end plan to disclose to the debtor the conditions
under which a finance charge may be imposed and the time period, if any,
within which the debtor may repay without a finance charge; the method
of determining the balance upon which a finance charge will be imposed;
the method of determining the amount of the finance charge with any
minimum charge which may be imposed, and four additional informa-
tional statements.225
At the end of each billing cycle, the creditor must transmit to the
debtor a statement, where applicable, of the outstanding balance at
the beginning of the statement period; the amount and date of each ex-
tension of credit and a brief description of the goods or services purchased
or furnished; the total credits to the account during the billing period;
and the amount of any finance charge which was added to the account
during the period, "itemized to show the amounts, if any, due to the appli-
cation of percentage rates and the amount, if any, imposed as a minimum
or fixed charge. 2 26
B. Sales Not Under Open End Credit Plans
Special rules are established for consumer credit sales not under an
open end credit plan. The consumer, as we have seen,227 is a natural per-
225. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 127(a) (4)-(7):
(4) Where one or more periodic rates may be used to compute the finance
charge, each such rate, the range of balances to which it is applicable, and the cor-
responding nominal annual percentage rate determined by multiplying the periodic
rate by the number of periods in a year.
(5) If the creditor so elects,(A) the average effective annual percentage rate of return received from
accounts under the plan for a representative period of time; or(B) whenever circumstances are such that the computation of a rate under
subparagraph (A) would not be feasible or practical, or would be misleading
or meaningless, a projected rate of return to be received from accounts under
the plan.
The Board shall prescribe regulations, consistent with commonly accepted standards
for accounting or statistical procedures, to carry out the purpose of this paragraph.
(6) The conditions under which any other charges may be imposed, and the
method by which they will be determined.
(7) The conditions under which the creditor may retain or acquire any security
interest in any property to secure the payment of any credit extended under the
plan, and a description of the interest or interests which may be so retained or
acquired.
226. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 127(b):
(b) The creditor of any account under an open end consumed credit plan shall
transmit to the obligor, for each billing cycle at the end of which there is an out-
standing balance in that account or with respect to which a finance charge is im-
posed, a statement setting forth each of the following items to the extent applicable:(1) The outstanding balance in the account at the beginning of the state-
ment period.
(2) The amount and date of each extension of credit during the period,
and, if a purchase was involved, a brief identification (unless previously furnished)
of the goods or services purchased.
(3) The total amount credited to the account during the period.
(4) The amount of any finance charge added to the account during the
period, itemized to show the amounts, if any, due to the application of percentage
rates and the amount, if any, imposed as a minimum or fixed charge.
227. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 103(e) and (h). (See note 221 supra).
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son to whom is extended money, property or services "primarily for per-
sonal, family, household, or agricultural purposes. '2 8 The term "credit
sale" includes both the ordinary sale and certain types of bailments or
leases which give the bailee or lessee the option to acquire ownership.229
These two definitions are not too dissimilar from those provided in the
U.C.C., although the "agricultural purposes" phrase is not found in the
Code in conjunction with "consumer goods.123 0
The creditor in a credit sale which is not under an open end arrange-
ment must disclose the cash price of the property or service purchase; the
sum of any amounts credited as a down payment (including any trade-in);
the difference between the down payment and the cash price; all other
charges, individually itemized, which are "included in the amount of credit
but which are not part of the finance charge;" and the total amount to be
financed.23' When the sale does not deal with the sale of a dwelling, the
creditor must also disclose the finance charge "which may in whole or in
part be designated as a time-price differential or any similar term .... ,1,212
The finance charge must be expressed as an annual percentage rate unless
it does not exceed five dollars on an amount not in excess of $75 or if it
does not exceed $7.50, but it is on an amount exceeding $75.23'
A creditor may not divide one consumer credit sale into two separate
sales in order to avoid this disclosure requirement.234 The creditor must
also disclose the number, amount and due dates or periods of payments
scheduled, default, delinquency or similar charges payable for late pay-
ments, and a description of any security interest "held or to be retained
or acquired" by the creditor with a clear identification of the property
encumbered by the security interest.235
The above disclosure must, in general, be made before the credit is
extended, although the disclosure may be made on the indebtedness con-
tract itself.23" Additional rules are provided for telephone or postal solici-
tations23T and for a series of credit sales made to one debtor.2 8
228. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 102(h).
229. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 103(g).
(g) The term, "credit sale" with respect to which credit is extended or arranged
by the seller. The term includes any contract in the form of a bailment or lease if
the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation for use a sum substantially
equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value of the property and services in-
volved and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee will become, or for no other or a
nominal consideration has the option to become, the owner of the property upon
full compliance with his obligation under the contract.
230. Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-109(1) and (2), 9-102(2) and 1-201(37) with §§ 102(h)
and 103(g) of the Act.
231. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(a) (1)-(5).
232. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(a).
233. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(a) (7).
234. Id.
235. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(a) (8)-(10).
236. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(b).
237. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(c).
238. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(d).
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C. Consumer Loans
The act also provides disclosure rules for consumer loans which do
not entail a consumer credit sale nor an open end consumer credit plan.
These resemble the disclosure rules previously discussed.23 9
D. Rights of Rescission
In any consumer credit transaction wherein a security interest is
retained or acquired in real property "which is used or is expected to be
used as the residence of the person to whom the credit is extended," the
debtor has the right to rescind the transaction before midnight of the
third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the
delivery of the disclosure required under the Act, whichever is later. The
debtor must notify the creditor of his intention to rescind in accordance
with regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. The creditor must clearly and conspicuously disclose (in accordance
with the Board's regulations) to any debtor that he has a right to
239. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 129:
Consumer loans not under open end credit plan
(a) Any creditor making a consumer loan or otherwise extending consumer
credit in a transaction which is neither a consumer credit sale nor under an open
end consumer credit plan shall disclose each of the following items, to the extent
applicable:
(1) The amount of credit of which the obligor will have the actual use,
or which is or will be paid to him or for his account or to another person on his
behalf.
(2) All charges, individually itemized, which are included in the amount of
credit extended but which are not part of the finance charge.
(3) The total amount to be financed (the sum of the amounts referred to
in paragraph (1) plus the amounts referred to in paragraph (2).
(4) Except in the case of a loan secured by a first lien on a dwelling and
made to finance the purchase of that dwelling, the amount of the finance charge.
(5) The finance charge expressed as an annual percentage rate except in
the case of a finance charge.
(A) which does not exceed $5 and is applicable to an extension of
consumer credit not exceeding $75, or
(B) which does not exceed $7.50 and is applicable to an extension of
consumer credit exceeding $75.
A creditor may not divide an extension of credit into two or more transactions to
avoid the disclosure of an annual percentage rate pursuant to this paragraph.
(6) The number, amount, and the due dates or periods of payments sched-
uled to repay the indebtedness.
(7) The default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of
late payments.
(8) A description of any security interest held or to be retained or ac-
quired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identifi-
cation of the property to which the security interest relates.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the disclosures required by
subsection (a) shall be made before the credit is extended, and may be made by
disclosing the information in the note or other evidence of indebtedness to be signed
by the obligor.
(c) If a creditor receives a request for an extension of credit by mail or tele-
phone without personal solicitation and the terms of financing, including the annual
percentage rate for representative amounts of credit, are set forth in the creditor's
printed material distributed to the public, or in the contract of loan or other printed
material delivered to the obligor, then the disclosures required under subsection (a)
may be made at any time not later than the date the first payment is due.
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rescind.24 The Act spells out the rights and duties of the debtor when he
elects to rescind. 41
E. Garnishment of Debtor's Earnings
Title III of the Act attempts to restrict creditors' rights to garnish
the earnings of debtors. Earnings are broadly defined as "compensation
paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages,
salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments
pursuant to a pension or retirement program.1242 Garnishment does not
have the usual narrow definition; it includes "any legal or equitable pro-
cedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be
withheld for payment of any debt. 248 In general, the maximum part of
the total "disposable" earnings of an individual for any work week which
is subjected to garnishment may not exceed twenty-five percent of his
disposable "earnings for that week" or "the amount by which his dis-
posable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum
hourly wage prescribed by Section 6(a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 . . ." whichever is less. 244 The term "disposable earnings" is
the take-home pay after deductions "of any amounts required by law to be
withheld." '245
It is to be noted that although this garnishment section is predicated
upon the idea of curbing predatory practices in the extension of credit 2 4
the Act is not limited to consumer credit transactions because the only
240. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 125.
241. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 125(b)-(e):
(b) When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a), he is
not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the
obligor becomes void upon such a rescission. Within ten days after receipt of a notice
of recission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as
earnest money, down payment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or
appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the
transaction. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor
may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor's obligations under
this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if
return of the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor
shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of the prop-
erty or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the creditor
does not take possession of the property within ten days after tender by the obligor,
ownership of the property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part for it.
(c) Notwithstanding any rule of evidence, written acknowledgment of receipt
of any disclosures required under this title by a person to whom a statement is re-
quired to be given pursuant to this section does no more than create a rebutable
presumption of delivery thereof.
(d) The Board may, if it finds that such action is necessary in order to permit
homeowners to meet bona fide personal financial emergencies, prescribe regulations
authorizing the modification or waiver of any rights created under this section to
the extent and under the circumstances set forth in those regulations.
(e) This section does not apply to the creation or retention of a first lien
against a dwelling to finance the acquisition of that dwelling.
242. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 302(a).
243. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 302(c).
244. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 303(a).
245. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 302(b).
246. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 301.
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exemptions from these restrictions are cases involving court orders for
support of any person, bankruptcy court orders under Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act and debts due for federal or state taxes. 47 It would
therefore appear that a tort judgment creditor would be subject to the
same restrictions as a consumer creditor.
The Secretary of Labor is empowered to exempt garnishments from
the restrictions of the Act if he determines that the state restrictions on
garnishment "are substantially similar to those provided" in the Act.248
The Act does not annul, alter, affect or exempt state laws which may pro-
hibit garnishments or provide for more limited garnishments than are
provided for under the Act.249
The Act attempts to protect the employment rights of debtors by
providing that no employer may discharge any employee because his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment "for any one indebted-
ness."" ° An employer who willfully violates this restriction shall be sub-
ject to a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both.25'
F. Civil and Criminal Remedies
The Act provides that any person who willfully and knowingly gives
false or inaccurate information, fails to disclose information which he is
required to disclose, uses any chart or table authorized by the Federal
Reserve Board under section 107 "in such a manner as to consistently
understate the annual percentage rate determined under Section 107(a)
1 (A)," or otherwise fails to comply with any requirement imposed under
the Act shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.252 It is suggested that only the clumsiest creditor
will ever feel the effect of these criminal sanctions; alleged "clerical"
errors will be the most likely defense gambit.
The civil liability sections of the Act hold more promise for the victim-
ized debtor. Any creditor who fails to disclose to the debtor any informa-
tion required under chapter 2 of the Act is liable to the debtor in an
amount equal to the sum of twice the amount of the finance charge, al-
though this liability shall not be less than $100 nor more than $1,000, and
costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as set by the
court when the debtor is successful in his action. 53
The creditor may escape from liability if within fifteen days after
discovering an error and prior to the institution of an action or the receipt
of written notice of the error he notifies the debtor of the error and makes
247. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 303(b) and (c).
248. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 305.
249. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 307.
250. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 304(a).
251. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 304(b).
252. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 112.
253. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 130(a).
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the appropriate adjustment in the account.254 Even if the creditor fails to
discover any error he may still escape from liability if he "shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
cedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error."2"'
The Act also attempts to give the debtor a remedy against the as-
signee of a security interest in real property. The debtor may maintain
his action against the assignee of the original creditor25
where the assignee, its subsidiaries, or affiliates were in a con-
tinuing business relationship with the original creditor either at
the time the credit was extended or at the time of the assignment,
unless the assignment was involuntary, or the assignee shows by
a preponderance of evidence that it did not have reasonable
grounds to believe that the original creditor was engaged in
violations of this chapter, and that it maintained procedures rea-
sonably adapted to apprise it of the existence of any such
violations.
This articulation of a "holder in due course" seems to delineate an objec-
tive standard of good faith and knowledge; the pure heart and empty head
test seems to be discarded.
It should be noted that the disclosure requirements under chapter 2
of the Act do not take effect until July 1, 1969, and the garnishment
provisions are not effective until July 1, 1970.5'
G. Observations
This Act, although a meaningful step forward, is not a panacea. Ad-
ministrative enforcement of the Act is primarily the responsibility of the
Federal Trade Commission,258 and it is doubtful whether this commission
(or any other federal commission) can really police this area. Enforcement
will come only from the enlightened use of the Act by consumers. As
previously suggested, criminal sanctions will deter only the clumsiest
creditor. The attorneys' fees provisions of the civil sanctions will probably
be the most effective tool in the enforcement.
It is suggested that the entire purpose of the Act can be and will be
frustrated by consumer credit dealers in their effective use of the concept
of "cash price."259 Many dealers of appliances never mark their inventory
on the showroom floor with any kind of price because their customers are
more concerned with "how much down and how much a month?" If the
salesman gives the customer a satisfactory answer to this question, he can
254. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 130(b).
255. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 130(c).
256. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 130(d).
257. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 504.
258. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 108.
259. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 128(a) (1).
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write in any "cash price" he wants and thereby juggle the finance charges
to give the customer the illusion that he is getting "a real good deal" on
his charges. A customer who is getting this "real good deal" on financing
charges is not going to see what other competitors are going to offer.
Furthermore, the whole idea of competition between credit sale dealers
may be unrealistic as applied to the slum area resident whose only real
source of credit is the slum area dealer.
The Act betrays a strangely myopic view towards the concept of a
"cooling-off period."' 60 The buyer has the right to rescind a security in-
terest arrangement encumbering real property within three days, while
the same victimized buyer has no similar right when he is buying goods.
The slum area resident will not usually be a home owner, but he will be
the victim of high pressure door-to-door salesmen selling vacuum cleaners,
stereo sets, deep freezers, etc., of dubious value and overinflated price. This
victim will have little, if any, real protection under the Act. It is also won-
dered if this three-day cooling-off period is long enough for the "home
improvement" buyer to realize that his shiny dream of aluminum siding on
his house may become a nightmare when he realizes what he will have to
pay for these "improvements" which often prove defective before he has
made his second payment.
III. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND UNCONscIoNABILITY
The most fertile soil for the growth of unconscionable contracts is
in the sales of "home improvements" and goods negotiated in the family
home by "pitch men" who appeal to the larceny in the souls of most of
us who desire to get something for nothing. Assume that a salesman for
The Hipressure Food Company visits John Consumer and his wife in
their home. The salesman "shows" John that he can purchase a deep
freeze for only $400 payable in "easy" monthly installments. Then the
salesman tells John that Hipressure will pay John $25 in cash (or deduct
a like amount from the monthly payments) for each buying customer
that John refers to Hipressure and that John will probably be able to
purchase this deep freeze for nothing in this manner and may even make
a profit. John and his wife sign a number of finely printed contracts, many
of which are incomplete, in a hurried manner because of the fast paper
shuffling of the salesman. Later John discovers that he is paying credit
charges of two or three times the value of his purchase and that the referral
plan discussed by the salesman is not mentioned in the agreement, or if it is
mentioned, it is hedged about with so many restrictions that it is value-
less. Let us assume further John and his wife are functional illiterates or
literate only in a foreign language. Will or should a court invalidate this
contract on the grounds of unconscionability by considering the totality of
the fact pattern? Or to put it in another manner, must all of the above
facts be present before a court will term the credit contract unconscionable?
260. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-312, § 125.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the courts have given a very liberal construc-
tion to the unconscionability rule of the Code in favor of the consumer.
In the case of Frostifresh Corporation v. Reynosos6x a Spanish-speaking
couple dealt with a Spanish-speaking salesman of a freezer company. The
contract was in English and it was not translated or explained to the couple
in Spanish; the inference was that the couple could not read English. The
cash sale price was $900, and a credit charge of $245.88 was added. The
cost of the appliance to the seller was $348. The seller claimed attorney's
fees of $227.35 and a late payment charge of $22.87. Fraud was not used
as a defense. The court held that:262
[T]he sale of the appliance at the price and terms indicated in
this contract is shocking to the conscience. The service charge,
which almost equals the price of the appliance is in and of itself
indicative of the oppression which was practiced on these defend-
ants. Defendants were handicapped by a lack of knowledge, both
as to the commercial situation and the nature and terms of the
contract which was submitted in a language foreign to them.
The court then granted judgment against the buyers for $348 (the seller's
cost) and denied recovery of any other damages. The New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division,6 3 affirmed the finding of unconscionability but
held that the seller should recover its net costs for the refrigerator-freezer,
plus a reasonable profit and plus trucking and service charges necessarily
incurred and reasonable finance charges. The court remanded the case for
a new trial limited to an assessment of the seller's damages.
It is submitted that neither court properly assessed damages. The
trial court, by limiting recovery to the seller's cost, unduly penalized the
seller by not awarding it the out-of-pocket expense of trucking and ser-
vicing. The Appellate Division, by awarding a reasonable net profit and
reasonable finance charges, has unduly rewarded the seller. Under this
holding, the sellers are encouraged to enter into unconscionable contracts
on the theory that most buyers will pay without litigation and those few
who do litigate will still be forced to pay a reasonable profit and reasonable
finance charges. The seller cannot lose under this policy.
A much more buyer-oriented approach was taken by the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court in the case of American Home Improvement, Inc. v.
Maclver.264 The plaintiff home improvement company entered into a con-
tract with the defendant homeowners to sell and install fourteen combina-
tion windows and a door and to "flintcoat" the walls of the home for a
total price of $1,759. The homeowners signed a credit application which
261. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966). See Comment,
Unconscionability-The Code, The Court and The Consumer, IX BOSTON COLL. IND. &
Comm. L. REv. 367 (1968) ; Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 330 (1968).
262. Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757.
263. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
264. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
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contained a blank promissory note. The credit application provided for the
total amount due, the number of months of payments and the amounts of
monthly payments, but it did not mention the rate of interest. When the
defendants received a copy of the approved credit application it showed
that their monthly payments were to cover principal, interest and life and
disability insurance. The plaintiff started work, but the defendants noti-
fied it to stop after only a negligible amount of work had been done. The
plaintiff paid a sales commission of $800 to the salesman. The court held
that the nonwilful failure of the seller to disclose the amount of finance
charges on the contract was a violation of the New Hampshire statutes
which require this disclosure, and that it would carry out the purpose of
the statute to deny any recovery to the seller. In addition to this reason,
the court noted that if the contract had been performed by the seller,
the buyers would have paid $2,568.60 for goods and services worth $959,
the difference consisting of a sales commission of $800 and interest and
carrying charges of $809.60. The court then held,2" 5
Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing of
value and under the transaction they entered into they were pay-
ing $1,609 for goods and services valued at far less, the contract
should not be enforced because of its unconscionable features.
In this case it is to be noted that there was no testimony indicating
that the homeowners were illiterate or naive, and no testimony indicating
the nature of the salesman's actions. The holding seems based squarely
upon a theory that when there is a vast disparity between the cash pur-
chase price and the time-price differential, the contract is unconscionable.
It is suggested that if the work had been completed, the court might per-
haps have awarded a quantum meruit recovery for the work under the
unconscionability part of the decision, but would have denied any recovery
at all under the New Hampshire disclosure statute.
In the case of In re State v. ITM, Incorporated,266 a New York trial
court cited the American Home Improvement case with approval for the
proposition that the "Supreme Court of New Hampshire refused to en-
force a contract unconscionable on grounds of price alone. '267 In the New
York case, a number of affiliated companies sold broilers, vacuum cleaners
and color television sets to consumers under a "referral" scheme which
"pyramided" or "chained" the customer referrals in such a manner that
the consumers supposedly were to pay nothing for their purchases and
were to earn large profits. Simple mathematics disclosed that the chain
referral system could not work; the sellers knew this but the buyers did
not. The buyers signed retail installment sales contracts for amounts from
two to six times the cost of the units to the sellers. The sellers then im-
mediately assigned the retail installment contracts to various finance
265. Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
266. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
267. Id. at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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companies and banks. The State of New York sought to enjoin these
companies from continuing their operations and from trying to enforce
their existing sales contracts. The court granted the injunction and de-
clared the contracts void on the basis that they did not comply with the
New York personal property statutes, that they contravened the New
York lottery statutes and that they were unconscionable under the U.C.C.
In dealing with the question of unconscionability the court stated,268
The respondents fraudulently misrepresented that the products
were not obtainable elsewhere at these prices. The goods were
available elsewhere and at much lower prices. It is clear that
these excessively high prices constituted "unconscionable con-
tractual provisions" within the meaning of subdivision 12 of sec-
tion 63 of the Executive Law.... But, even if the prices charged
were not unconscionable per se, they were unconscionable within
the context of this case. [The court cited section 2-302 of the
U.C.C.]
The court, after citing the American Home Improvement case for the rule
that a contract will be unconscionable when there is a vast disparity be-
tween what the buyer receives and what he is paying, stated,269
The same disparity exists in the transactions in the instant case
to clearly render such transactions unconscionable and when the
deceptive practices are also considered, there can be no doubt
about the unreasonableness and unfairness of these agreements.
The court finally forestalled the objections that might be raised by
even the most fervent follower of the caveat emptor school,27°
No longer do we believe that fraud may be perpetrated by the
cry of caveat emptor. We have reached the point where "Let the
buyer beware" is a poor business philosophy for a social order
allegedly based upon man's respect for his fellow man. Let the
seller beware, too! A free enterprise system not founded upon
personal morality will ultimately lose freedom. We also believe
that it is right, proper, just and equitable to tell the consumer,
clearly and adequately, that he is entering into a contract and
that he is personally liable for the entire contract price and that
he will be required to make stipulated monthly payments, plus
carrying charges, etc., in language that the least educated person
can understand. And if he chooses not to do so, but instead lures
an innocent person into a predicament where a heavy obligation
is incurred due to the fraudulent means exercised by the repre-
sentative, should the innocent victim suffer and hold harmless
the seller and thereby reward him for his highhanded conduct?
268. Id. at 53, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
269. Id. at 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
270. Id.
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It should be noted that consumers who have fallen into the trap of
being induced to enter into purchases as a result of the referral schemes
used by salesmen, may be relieved from liability upon the ground that
the scheme is a lottery in addition to the defense of its unconscionability 7 1
A year after the decision in the ITM case, another New York court
was confronted with a case wherein the assignor of the plaintiff finance
company sold a used automobile for a purchase price of $939.75 plus a
credit service charge of $242.47.272 The buyer alleged that the car was
defective, and that he spent $570 to repair it. The court stated that exces-
sively high prices may constitute unconscionable contractual provisions
within the meaning of the U.C.C.2 73 The court cited the ITM and Ameri-
can Home Improvement cases and the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co.1 4 as authority for this statement. Then, in a completely in-
consistent manner, the court quoted extensively from the Williams case
(which did not involve excessively high prices) for the proposition that
the buyers when sued by the finance company "are entitled to a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence as to its [the sales transaction's]
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in determining
whether the contract was as a matter of law unconscionable. 275
In the Williams case a furniture dealer sold a stereo set for $514.95
on credit to a woman who was receiving welfare payments of $218 per
month for herself and seven children. The dealer had knowledge of the
consumer's financial status. The consumer owed the dealer $164 as the
balance of her prior purchases when she bought the stereo, and she had
made purchases totaling $1,800 over the years from this dealer. The
security agreement under which she bought the stereo provided that her
payments would be prorated over the purchase price of the stereo and
over all other purchases made by her. Each new purchase automatically
became subject to a security interest arising out of her previous purchases,
and upon default in her payments the dealer had the right to repossess all
of the goods purchased. The consumer defaulted, and the dealer sought to
replevy all of her purchases. The events took place before the adoption of
the U.C.C. in the District of Columbia, and the trial court denied any
relief to the consumer on the grounds that there was no legislation giving
the courts power to invalidate the dealer's actions which were character-
ized as smacking of "sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings.
276
271. E.g., M. Lippincott Mortgage Investment Co. v. Childress, 204 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1968) ; In re State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1966) ; Sherwood & Roberts-Takima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1966);
see Comment, Let the "Seller" Beware-Another Approach to the Referral Sales Scheme, 21
U. MIAMI L. REv. 861 (1968).
272. Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct.
1967).
273. Id. at 621, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
274. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
275. 279 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1967).
276. 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though the U.C.C. was
adopted subsequent to the transactions involved, the unconscionability
rule of the Code could be adopted by the court in the exercise of its powers
to develop the common law of the District of Columbia.
The court then attempted to fill the void left by the Code in its fail-
ure to define the concept of unconscionability,277
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include
an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a
particular case can only be determined by consideration of all
the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the
meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of
bargaining power. The manner in which the contract was entered
is also relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the con-
tract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a rea-
sonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or
were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and
minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one who
signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be
held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real
choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or
no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or
even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given
to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the
agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are
so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary con-
cern must be with the terms of the contract considered in light
of the circumstances existing when the contract was made. The
test is not simple, nor can it be mechanically applied. The terms
are to be considered "in the light of the general commercial back-
ground and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case." Corbin suggests the test as being whether the terms are
"so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores
and business practices of the time and place." . . . We think
this formulation correctly states the test to be applied in those
cases where no meaningful choice was exercised upon entering
the contract.
The court's emphasis of the phrase "meaningful choice" is a trouble-
some one. In the typical contract of adhesion (which is more or less uni-
form throughout the seller's industry), the consumer does not have a
meaningful choice. However, did all or a majority of furniture dealers in
the District of Columbia use the same boiler-plate form as was discussed
277. Id. at 449.
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by the court? The opinion failed to answer this question. The opinion
failed to discuss any facts of overreaching by the dealer, other than the
security agreement lien on all purchases, and any lack of education of
the consumer-the fact that the buyer was on the relief rolls does not
necessarily indicate a lack of education or ignorance. If a lack of "bar-
gaining power" is to be the test, then it is doubtful that any person who
buys furniture on credit has any real bargaining power. If one considers
the large depreciation inherent in the furniture trade on the consumer
level, the fact that a dealer demands the right to repossess additional
furniture might not be too unreasonable.2 7 8
The unconscionability doctrine was applied to a most unusual type
of credit contract in W. T. Grant Co. v. Walsh.279 A husband and wife
agreed to pay $246 over a 24-month period for coupons worth $200
issued by W. T. Grant Co. The contract provided that if the coupons
were lost, stolen or destroyed, or detached from the coupon book prior
to use, the customer would still be liable for the remainder of the payments.
The coupons could be applied toward the purchase of goods from the
issuer, W. T. Grant Company. In effect the issuer was selling coupons on
credit rather than goods themselves. The husband and wife understood
that they were applying for the usual kind of charge account upon which
there would be no payment due until purchases of goods were made and
then the payment would not exceed ten dollars per month. The couple's
beliefs were the result of misrepresentations made by Grant's employee.
The court noted that Grant was charging interest on its customers'
accounts before any purchases were made, and Grant was claiming the
right to collect even if the coupons were never used or if they were lost,
stolen or destroyed. The court refused any recovery to Grant and stated,80
Its [Grant's] greed has carried it beyond the bounds of an un-
conscionable agreement to a point where its desire to even econo-
mize on clerical expenses thwarts its own proofs.
It is difficult to imagine a more one-sided scheme for the
enrichment of a commercial establishment at the expense of a
potential customer.... The court is of the opinion that this plan
is, in addition to its other faults, against public policy.
Section 2-302 of the Code provides that the court "may limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result." A good illustration of an application of this clause appeared in
the case of Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp.,2 ' in which Robinson pur-
chased an automobile under a security agreement. Two weeks after Rob-
inson defaulted in his payments, the finance company repossessed his car.
278. See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. Rav. 445 (1968).
279. 100 N.J. Super. 60, 241 A.2d 46 (Dist. Ct. 1968).
280. Id. at 63, 241 A.2d at 49.
281. 4 U.C.C. Rept. Serv. 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
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Robinson paid the late payment plus charges, but the finance company
failed to return his car. Robinson was unable to obtain co-signers on the
contract, and the company also claimed it was unable to locate Robinson's
place of employment. Robinson made two further defaults in his pay-
ments while the finance company had possession of the car. Robinson sued
to recover his automobile and the court held that282
It is difficult to ascertain a rational upholding defendant's right
to collect the past due payments plus late charges and a reposses-
sion fee and, at the same time, fail to return the repossessed car.
It is also difficult to understand defendant's contention that re-
possession may not now be ordered, for plaintiff has failed to
make the last two payments due, for these last two payments be-
came due while the car was being withheld from plaintiff's
possession.
Unconscionable conduct is prescribed by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, and defendant's conduct herein, even if allowed under
the contract between the parties, cannot withstand comparison
to the requisite standard of commercially reasonable conduct
required under the Code.
IV. ACCELERATION OF THE DEBT FOR DEFAULT OR INSECURITY
Let us assume that the security agreement and promissory note
signed by John Consumer in his credit purchase of an air-conditioner and
refrigerator from Merchants Appliance Company provides that the holder
of the chattel paper may accelerate the entire indebtedness in the event
of default in making installment payments, or for failure to maintain the
collateral in a proper manner, or upon failure of John Consumer to give
additional collateral. The chattel paper283 may also provide that Mer-
chants may accelerate the entire indebtedness at any time when it deems
itself insecure. The presence of some or all of these clauses create two
problems, (a) what effect they have on negotiability of the promissory
note, which is important if the finance company holder of the note claims
that it is a holder in due course, and (b) whether there are any limitations
on the right of Merchants Appliance Company (or the finance company
which has purchased the note from Merchants) to exercise this accelera-
tion.
Prior to the Code, it was the general rule that a clause allowing the
holder to accelerate the entire indebtedness upon a default by the maker
or upon the happening of some objective event did not make the note
payable at an indefinite time and it would not affect its negotiability.284
Clauses which allowed the holder to accelerate at will or when he felt
himself to be insecure were usually held payable at an indefinite time sub-
282. 4 U.C.C. Rept. Serv. IS, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
283. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(b).
284. W. BnroN, Bis AND NoTs 57-68 (2d ed. 1961).
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ject to the subjective will of the holder and therefore non-negotiable."' 5
The Code now provides that an instrument is payable at a definite time
if by its terms it is payable "at a definite time subject to any accelera-
tion."2 ' The phrase "any acceleration" includes acceleration at the option
of the maker or holder or an acceleration which is automatic upon the
occurrence of some event. 287
As a corollary of this rule, the Code provides that any clause in an
agreement which gives a party the right to accelerate payment or per-
formance or to require collateral or additional collateral "at will or when
he deems himself insecure" shall be construed to mean that the party has
this power "only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired."28 The burden of establishing a lack of good
faith is on the party against whom the power is exercised.2 18 This good
faith requirement is designed to act as a fetter upon the mere whim or
caprice of the creditor. However, with the burden of proof placed upon the
debtor it is to be doubted that this good faith limitation will have much
practical value.
Intimately related to this concept of giving additional collateral when
the creditor deems himself to be insecure, is the Code provision that a
security interest cannot attach under an after-acquired property clause to
consumer goods unless the debtor acquires rights in these goods within ten
days after the secured party gives value.29° Under this rule it would appear
that inasmuch as the security interest could not attach to consumer goods
acquired more than ten days after the secured party gave value, any
acceleration clause in consumer paper which provided that the holder
could accelerate the entire indebtedness if the consumer-debtor should
fail to supply additional collateral in consumer goods should be ineffective
unless the consumer debtor acquired rights in the goods within ten days
after the secured party gave value.29' It should be noted, however, that
this rule may be more or less circumvented by a provision in the note and
security agreement which subjects other consumer goods already owned
by the consumer to the lien of the security agreement. A clause of this
type will be effective unless it is so oppressive that a court determines
that it is unconscionable in the light of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Company, which has been discussed.29 2
V. FINANCE COMPANIES VIS-A-VIS JOHN CONSUMER
John Consumer's complaints about breach of express and implied
warranties will be of little avail against a merchant who has gone out of
285. Id.
286. U.C.C. § 3-109(1) (c).
287. U.C.C. § 3-109, Comment 4.
288. U.C.C. § 1-208.
289. Id.
290. U.C.C. § 9-204(4) (b).
291. Of course, a broad acceleration clause allowing the holder to accelerate when he
deems himself insecure will circumvent this defense.
292. See notes 274-78 suPra
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business or has gone bankrupt since the sale, although his complaints will
often appear as defenses when he is threatened with suit (or is sued) by a
finance company which bought John's chattel paper (note and security
agreement) from the Merchant. Let us assume that John Consumer pur-
chased the air-conditioner and refrigerator from Merchants Appliance
Company. John made a small down payment and signed a promissory
note and some kind of security agreement for the remainder of the pur-
chase price. The security agreement and promissory note were probably
on forms supplied by the Fabulous Finance Company, and this same
finance company probably ran a credit check on John before purchasing
the chattel paper from Merchants Appliance Company. Neither the air-
conditioner nor the refrigerator has met the express and implied war-
ranties made by Merchants Appliance, but Merchants has gone bankrupt,
and John has refused to make any more payments. The finance company
has now filed suit against John Consumer and it claims that it is free of
any defenses which John may have against Merchants Appliance because
(a) it is a holder in due course; (b) John Consumer in the security agree-
ment agreed that he would not assert any defenses as to quality as against
any assignee of the chattel paper; (c) the security agreement disclaimed
any and all express and implied warranties; and (d) on any one, or all, of
these grounds, Fabulous Finance Company takes free of John's defenses.
A. Holder in Due Course
Fabulous Finance Company must take the promissory note for value,
in good faith and without notice of any defense against it in order to be a
holder in due course.293 Under the older orthodox view the fact that Fabu-
lous Finance prepared or supplied the promissory note and security
agreement form used by Merchants Appliance Company and ran a credit
check on John Consumer would not be enough to show that Fabulous
took with notice or in bad faith.2"4 However, the more modern view is
that when a finance company is closely connected with the vendor of the
goods it will be deprived of any holder in due course standing under the
view that its close connection either gives it notice of a defense or it will
not be a good faith holder. The cases are unsatisfactory from an analytical
standpoint-there seems to be a piling of inference upon inference to
reach a pre-determined end.2 95 They may perhaps be justified on a social
engineering basis when confined to consumer transactions. Unfortunately,
they have spilled over into sales by merchants to merchants, and mer-
chants do not need an umbrella of protections which may be necessary
over the heads of consumers.29
293. U.C.C. §§ 3-302 to -304.
294. W. BErITON, BILLS AND NOTES §§ 100-112 (2d ed. 1961).
295. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Comment, Unico v. Owen:
Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course Under the U.C.C., 54 VA. L. REv.
678 (1968); HIMC Investment Co. v. Sicilliano, 37 U.S.L.W. 2172 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1968).
296. See, e.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); National State Bank
v. Robert Richter Hotel, Inc., 186 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) ; National State Bank v.
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A few states have legislated in this area by providing that a finance
company may not claim holder in due course status in consumer finance
transactions.""1 Others have provided that the consumer has a "complaint
period" or "cooling-off period" of ten or fifteen days in which to complain
about the quality of the goods. The finance companies are required to give
notice to the consumer of his right to complain within this statutory period,
and, if he does so, the finance company will not be able to claim any rights
against the consumer.298 It may be suggested that even the most shoddy
merchandise will stand up for ten or fifteen days, and this complaint period
will be of little use. 99
There may be a practical way for merchants to circumvent these
statutes and the holder in due course problem. John Consumer desires to
purchase an air-conditioner and refrigerator from Merchants Appliance
Company on a credit basis. Merchants tells John that it is not equipped
to handle all the details involved with credit sales, and it suggests that he
visit a small loan company down the street. John signs a security agree-
ment with the small loan company which encumbers all of his furniture
(including perhaps the air-conditioner and refrigerator). John explains
the purpose of his loan, and the small loan company tells him "that is
your business, you may spend the money as you like." The loan company
gives John the cash or a check made payable to him, and he turns the
cash or indorses the check over to Merchants Appliance Company. If the
consumer goods are defective, the loan company is not concerned; John
must deal with Merchants and if it goes bankrupt, John will bear the loss.
If John defaults on his loan, the loan company will take possession of his
furniture (including the air-conditioner and the refrigerator).
B. Waiver of Defenses
The Code provides that unless a statute or decision of the state
establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, the
buyer may agree that he will not assert against an assignee of the security
agreement any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor. 00 This lender-oriented protective device carries the seeds of its
own destruction because a court may accept the offer contained in this
section and hold that this waiver clause is ineffective in consumer goods
cases. Or the court may simply hold that the "assignee" is so closely
Robert Richter Hotel, Inc., 188 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); and Industrial Credit Co. v.
Mike Bradford & Co., 177 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
297. Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLum. L. REV.
387, 433-38 (1968); Alcoa Credit Co. v. Nickerson, 5 U.C.C. REasT. SERV. 152 (Mass. App.
Div., N.D. 1968). In Pennsylvania, the finance company which knowingly finances the sale
of a motor vehicle cannot be a holder in due course. Casey v. Philadelphia Auto Sales Co.,
428 Pa. 155, 236 A.2d 800 (1968).
298. ThE LAW AND THE Low INco'E CONSUMER 249-51 (C. Katz ed. 1968).
299. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 297 at 434-35, for additional criticsms of this
"complaint" rule.
300. U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
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connected to the merchant-vendor that the assignee cannot be considered
as taking in good faith and without notice. The same approach used in
the holder in due course cases can render this section completely ineffec-
tive, particularly in the consumer goods area.
An example of this approach was presented in the recent pre-Code
case of Unico v. Owen. 301 Universal Stereo Corporation sold stereo albums
(to be delivered over a five and one-half year period) and a stereo record
player under a retail installment sales contract. The cash price was listed
at $698 and the buyers paid $30 down. The balance of $668, plus a fee
of $1.40 and a time-price differential of $150.32, left a time balance of
$819.82 to be paid in 36 equal monthly installments of $22.77. The buyers
signed a promissory note which was indorsed with recourse to Unico, a
finance company which was formed expressly for the purpose of financing
Universal. The installment contract was a maze of small print in favor of
Universal. Universal had five and one-third years to deliver all of the
records, while the customer had to pay in three years. The buyers re-
ceived twelve stereo albums and the record player but no further deliveries
were made, and Universal became insolvent. Unico then sued the con-
sumers for the balance due on the note, plus penalties and a twenty per-
cent attorney's fee. The buyer claimed a failure of consideration.
Unico claimed that even if it were not a holder in due course (as
found by the trial court) it should recover under a clause in the install-
ment contract wherein the buyers agreed not to assert any default of
the seller (Universal) as a defense or counterclaim to a suit by the as-
signee (Unico). The court held that this clause was "an unfair imposition
on a consumer goods purchaser and is contrary to public policy" 302 on
the grounds that it is opposed to the policy of the N.I.L., the assignment
statute of New Jersey and the policy of New Jersey to protect conditional
vendees from imposition by conditional vendors and installment sellers.
The court then noted that sections 9-206(1) and 2-302 of the U.C.C. are
closely linked and constitute an intention "to leave in the hands of the
courts the continued application of common law principles in deciding in
consumer goods cases whether such waiver clauses as the one imposed on
Owen in this case are so one-sided as to be contrary to public policy. °303
The court then held that the waiver clause was unenforceable and invalid
against the buyer.
C. Disclaimer of Warranties
Section 9-206(2) of the Code states that "when a seller retains a
purchase money security interest in goods the Article on Sales ... governs
the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the seller's war-
ranties." This sub-section is designed to cover cases in which John Con-
301. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
302. Id. at 123, 232 A.2d at 417.
303. Id. at 125, 232 A.2d at 418.
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sumer has entered into a sales agreement with Merchants Appliance
Company which contains express warranties and then Merchants uses a
security agreement form which disclaims all warranties. The separate
security agreement disclaimer may not take away warranties given by
the separate sales agreement. However, if Merchants uses one written
form which combines the sales aspects and the financing aspects, it may
disclaim warranties in accordance with the provisions of article 2."4 If
this approach is taken, it would appear that Fabulous Finance Company
would step into the shoes of Merchants Appliance Company, and if the
disclaimer destroys any remedy of John Consumer against Merchants it
will have the same effect in the hands of Fabulous Finance. John's only
weapons then will be that the bargain was unconscionable and in bad
faith in accordance with the Unico3°5 holding.
D. Redemption Rights
Redemption rights of John Consumer whose refrigerator and air-
conditioner have been repossessed by Merchant Appliance Company will
probably be of small concern to John or his lawyer. If one is financially
able to redeem, he probably will not default in his installment payments
and the redemption problem will not arise. However, if we assume that
John Consumer did default in his monthly installments but has enjoyed
a windfall we will be concerned with his rights to redeem. John Consumer
has an absolute right to redeem at any time before Merchants Appliance
Company has sold, leased or otherwise disposed of the goods under sec-
tion 9-504, unless John has otherwise agreed in writing with Merchants
after his default or if John fails to object in writing within thirty days
after John receives written notice from Merchant Appliance Company that
it intends to retain the refrigerator and air-conditioner in satisfaction of
the obligation." 6 In the ordinary case it would probably prove advanta-
geous to John Consumer if Merchant Appliance Company would be willing
to keep the repossessed collateral in full satisfaction for the debt because
the resale value of used consumer goods would probably be less than the
remaining balance of the debt, the reasonable expenses of retaking, hold-
ing, preparing for sale, selling, and attorney's fees if provided for in the
agreement. °7 This might not be true, however, if John Consumer has
paid a large portion of the debt. The Code recognizes this fact by provid-
ing that if John Consumer has paid sixty percent of the cash price in a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods or has paid sixty
percent of the loan in which consumer goods were given as collateral and
has not after default renounced or modified his rights, the lender must
sell it at private or public sale. If the lender fails to do so, within thirty
304. U.C.C. § 9-206, Comment 2.
305. Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
306. U.C.C. §§ 9-504 to -506.
307. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (a) and (b).
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days after repossession, the debtor, John Consumer, may sue the lender,
Merchants Appliance, for conversion10 8 or for "an amount not less than
the credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the
debt or the time price differential plus ten percent of the cash price."30 9
The phrase "not less than" in the above rule means that this is the mini-
mum recovery for John Consumer; he may receive more in an appropriate
case. 10 This rule requires the lawyer for John Consumer to compute the
possible damages under a trover theory and under the Code theory and
then to choose the more advantageous remedy.
In addition to these monetary remedies, the Code gives John Con-
sumer the right to apply for an injunction restraining Merchants Appli-
ance from acting contrary to John's rights and ordering Merchants to
follow the requirements of the Code."' In accordance with the general
rule prior to the Code, John Consumer may not waive, renounce or modify
his rights to redeem and to demand compliance with these protective rules
in the original security agreement. He may only do so after default by a
separate written instrument. 12
VI. FIXTURES
Ordinarily, any perfection and remedy problems dealing with fixtures
are of primary concern to the merchant, purchase money lenders and own-
ers and mortgagees of the land, rather than to the consumer who happens
to buy fixture goods on a purchase money security interest arrangement
with the merchant. For example, John Consumer purchases a room air-
conditioner from Merchants Appliance Company for installation in the
wall of John's home. John purchased the air-conditioner under a purchase
money security interest agreement given to Merchants Appliance Com-
pany. In order for Merchants to perfect its security interest against an
existing mortgagee of John's home and any subsequent mortgagee or
judgment lien creditor who has secured a judgment against John Con-
sumer, Merchants Appliance Company should file, in the real property
records of the county in which the land is located, a financing statement
which describes the fixture and (in most states) simply gives a street ad-
dress for the real property.313 If John Consumer should default in his pay-
ments, Merchants Appliance Company may repossess the air-conditioner,
sell it and hold John for the balance of the unpaid purchase price.3 1 4 If
we assume that John has made some payments and the machine is rela-
tively new with mere ordinary wear and tear, the balance may not be too
great a sum.
308. U.C.C. § 9-505.
309. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
310. U.C.C. § 9-507, Comment 1.
311. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
312. U.C.C. §§ 9-506 and 9-505.
313. U.C.C. §§ 9-313(2) and (3), 9-401 and 9-402.
314. U.C.C. §§ 9-313, 9-503 and 9-504(2).
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The result under the Florida version of section 9-313 of the Code
should be compared. In Florida the purchase money vendor (or lender)
may not secure a purchase money security interest which has priority as
against "any person with an interest in the real estate at the time the
security interest in the goods is perfected or at the time the goods are
affixed to the real estate," unless he consents in writing or disclaims an
interest in the goods as fixtures.815 It would appear, therefore, that if the
existing mortgagee failed to consent or disclaim the purchase money ven-
dor could not repossess the air-conditioner upon default by John Con-
sumer and John would then be liable for the entire unpaid balance, with-
out any allowance for the repossession sales price as would be true under
the original version of this section. This Florida version of section 9-313,
which was obviously designed to protect mortgagees of land at the ex-
pense of purchase money vendors (or lenders) of goods, may also ad-
versely affect the interests of consumers in the event of default. It may
also have the more immediate and serious effects of inhibiting the credit
sales of fixtures to consumers and causing an increase in the financing
costs of these purchases because of increased losses suffered by merchants
and lenders. The economic effect may be more serious than the legal one.
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.C.C. has been criticized for its alleged lack of sufficient pro-
visions designed to protect the consumer, and the critics have advocated
that this alleged failure should be cured by the adoption of a Uniform
Consumer Credit Code or by other consumer-oriented legislation.31 As
a minority of one, the author suggests that these objections may be proved
groundless in the light of experience within the next few years. In fifty-
one American jurisdictions, the U.C.C. has been effective in only twenty-
three prior to 1965. Of the twenty-eight jurisdictions in which the Code
was made effective during the years 1965-1968, four jurisdictions have
lived with it for less than one year, nine for less than two years, eight for less
than three years and seven for less than four years."17 The relatively small
number of consumer cases arising under the unconscionability rule of
the Code have been favorable to the consumer, indicating that the courts
have not had as much trouble with the Code as have the academic critics.
It is believed that the unconscionability and good faith rules of the Code
are sufficiently broad to enable the courts to police oppressive sales and
315. FLA. STAT. § 679.9-313 (1967).
316. E.g., Robinson, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 22 PERSONAL FIN. L. Q. REP.
118 (1968); Dennon, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code Bombshell, 22 PERSONAL FIN. L.
Q. REP. 125 (1968) ; Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Mic. L. REv. 1465 (1967) ; Jordan & Warren, The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1968); Graham, The U3C, 42 FLA.
B. J. 1043 (1968).
317. UnIFORM LAWS ANN., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Supp. 9, 1967).
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credit sales to consumers. We ought to give the Code a sufficient trial
period before we decide that it does not protect the consumer.
We ought to consider also the complete "ecology" of the consumer
credit field from a sociological, economic, psychological, commercial, edu-
cational and legal viewpoint before placing new restrictions on the lend-
ing class. A solely law-oriented approach may result in a "cure" which
effectively denies credit to the vast majority of low-income consumers and
even higher interest rates to a small minority of their neighbors. Low-in-
come consumers want television sets and appliances now, and the results
could be chaotic if they are deprived, in a period of rising expectations,
of sources of credit as the unforeseen result of efforts by well-intentioned
persons. It is also believed that it is a mistake to frame legislation for all
credit sale consumers (middle class, low income and relief recipients)
based upon the peculiar problems unfortunately present in the ghetto. The
upper or middle class consumer who finances his automobile through a
bank loan does not need the same protections which may be needed by a
low-income consumer buying a used automobile financed by a gouging
ghetto financing agency. The cure ought to be tailored to fit the problems.
Unwise tampering with our credit economy could be a disaster for it and
for all consumers. 8
318. For an excellent discussion of the consumer-credit regulation problem see Kripke,
supra note 278. But see Greenwalt, One-Stop Service for Poor Consumer, 4 Tami. No. 4, 38
(1968) for a contrary viewpoint.
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